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Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement and
Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws
Robert H. Lande and Joshua P. Davis
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to determine which type of antitrust
enforcement deters more anticompetitive behavior: the U.S. Department
of Justice (“DOJ”) Antitrust Division’s criminal anti-cartel enforcement
program or private enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws. The answer to this
question—and answers to related questions concerning deterrence and
compensation issues—could have important implications for the United
States, pertaining both to appropriate antitrust remedies and to the course
of litigation of private antitrust cases. Those answers also could influence
other nations considering either adopting or changing criminal penalties
for competition law violations, or allowing private rights of action by the
victims of competition law violations.
Anti-cartel enforcement by the DOJ long has been the gold standard
of antitrust enforcement worldwide. If a country were to have only one
type of antitrust violation, surely it would be against horizontal cartels,
and surely this law would be enforced by that country’s government
officials. Even critics who believe that monopolization and vertical
restraints never or rarely should be challenged almost always believe in
 The authors are, respectively, Venable Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School
of Law, and a Director of the American Antitrust Institute; Associate Dean for Faculty Scholarship,
Professor of Law, and Director, Center for Law and Ethics, University of San Francisco School of
Law, and member of the Advisory Board of the American Antitrust Institute. This Article in part
relies upon and significantly extends analysis contained in the authors’ earlier joint work, Benefits
From Private Antitrust Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 879 (2008)
[hereinafter
Lande
&
Davis,
Benefits],
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1090661 (last revised April 27, 2010). For
summaries of the individual case studies analyzed in this article, see Robert H. Lande & Joshua P.
Davis, Benefits from Antitrust Private Antitrust Enforcement: Forty Individual Case Studies,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1105523 (last revised Oct. 15, 2008). The
authors are grateful to the American Antitrust Institute for funding the empirical portions of this
study, to participants in conferences sponsored by the American Antitrust Institute, George
Washington University, and the Lear Conference, and to Albert A. Foer, John M. Connor, and John
R. Woodbury for comments and suggestions, and to Thomas Appel, Kathi Black, Christine Carey,
Joanna Diamond, Ken Fung, Gary Stapleton, Thomas Weaver, and Michael Cannon for valuable
research assistance.

315

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1/31/2013 3:27 PM

2011

strong anti-cartel enforcement.1 People in the antitrust world disagree
about many things, but it is extremely difficult to find responsible critics
who do not applaud the U.S. government’s anti-cartel program.2 We
strongly agree with this almost-unanimous consensus and are second to
no one in our appreciation of the DOJ’s anti-cartel activity. In terms of
taxpayer dollars well spent, the program surely is one of the most
outstanding in all of government.
By contrast, private antitrust enforcement under U.S. antitrust laws
gets little respect and much criticism. Indeed, it is difficult to find many
people other than members of the plaintiffs’ bar willing to say much
good about private enforcement. For example, even moderates like FTC
Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch believe that treble damage class action
cases “are almost as scandalous as the price-fixing cartels that are
generally at issue . . . . The plaintiffs’ lawyers . . . stand to win almost
regardless of the merits of the case.”3 Due to these widespread beliefs,
former FTC Chairman William E. Kovacic recently summarized the

1. See ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 66–67
(2d ed. 1993); see also id. at 263 (“The law’s oldest and, properly qualified, most valuable rule states
that it is illegal per se for competitors to agree to limit rivalry among themselves. . . . Its
contributions to consumer welfare over the decades have been enormous.”); id. at 163–97 (Bork’s
analysis of monopolization and attempted monopolization); id. at 225–45 (Bork’s analysis regarding
conglomerate mergers); id. at 280–98 (Bork’s analysis regarding price maintenance); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Treble What?, 55 Antitrust L.J. 95 (1986).
2. Both Democratic and Republican administrations have made anti-cartel activity their
highest priority. Both have succeeded wonderfully at this crucial task and for this they have been
applauded widely. It is difficult to find many who have even questioned the DOJ’s anti-cartel
enforcement, except for small criticisms at the margins. If we may use the terms of professors, it is
possible to find critics who give the DOJ anti-cartel programs an “A” instead of an “A+,” but almost
impossible to find responsible critics grading them lower than this. See AMERICAN ANTITRUST
INSTITUTE, THE NEXT ANTITRUST AGENDA: THE AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE’S TRANSITION
REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY TO THE 44TH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 2–3 (2008),
available at http:// www.antitrustinstitute.org/node/11001 (describing “the resilience of antitrust”).
By contrast, it is easy to find critics on both sides of the political aisle giving much lower grades,
even failing grades, to other DOJ antitrust programs. For example, the AAI’s report sharply
criticized the DOJ’s record in the Section 2 area. See id. at 55, 58–59.
3. J. Thomas Rosch, Fed. Trade Comm’n Comm’r, Remarks to the Antitrust Modernization
Commission 9–10 (June 8, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/ rosch/RoschAMC%20Remarks.June8.final.pdf. Similarly, Steve Newborn, co-head of Weil, Gotshal & Manges’
Antitrust/Competition practice, was asked which areas of antitrust need reform, and replied: “[c]lass
actions: they are increasingly beneficial only to plaintiffs’ law firms and not to consumers.” Q&A
with
Weil
Gotshal’s
Steven
A.
Newborn,
LAW360
(June
1,
2009),
http://law360.com/competition/articles/103359.
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conventional wisdom about private enforcement succinctly: “private
rights of actions U.S. style are poison.”4
Given these criticisms, it may come as a surprise—even a shock—
that a quantitative analysis of the facts demonstrates that private antitrust
enforcement probably deters more anticompetitive conduct than the
DOJ’s anti-cartel program.5 This deterrence effect is, of course, in
addition to its virtually unique compensation function.6 If this article’s
conclusion about the importance of private enforcement for deterrence is
true, private antitrust enforcement also should receive much of the praise
given to DOJ anti-cartel efforts. Further, private enforcement should be
encouraged in the United States rather than hampered through new
legislation7 or through restrictive judicial interpretation of existing law.8
And the United States’ version of private antitrust enforcement should be
something for other countries to consider.9
4. FTC: WATCH No. 708, Nov. 19, 2007, at 4 (quoting William E. Kovacic speaking at an
ABA panel on Exemptions and Immunities where he summarized the conventional wisdom in the
field but was not necessarily agreeing with it). For additional criticisms of private antitrust
enforcement, see Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note *, at 883–89.
5. We will not, however, attempt to compare private enforcement to FTC enforcement
because, except for a few disgorgement cases, the FTC obtains only injunctive relief.
6. See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note *, at 881–83; Harry First, Lost in Conversation:
The Compensatory Function of Antitrust Law (2009) (unpublished draft) (on file with author).
Another goal of private enforcement is to restore competition to markets. See Lande & Davis,
Benefits, supra note *, at 881.
7. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified
throughout 28 U.S.C.). The Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) allows defendants to remove most
class actions to federal court and, as a result, arguably makes class certification for state law claims
more difficult. Stephen Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A
Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1530–31 (noting one goal of CAFA was to make class
certification more difficult for plaintiffs).
8. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (overruling Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41 (1957), and applying heightened pleading standard to private antitrust cases).
9. In a thoughtful critique of this Article, John R. Woodbury suggests the possibility that
private enforcement, even if more effective as a deterrent than DOJ criminal enforcement—indeed,
particularly under those circumstances—may lead to over-deterrence. See John R. Woodbury, Paper
Trail: Working Papers and Recent Scholarship, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE 3–4 (August 2010),
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/10/08/Aug10-pTrail8-2f.pdf. He rests this possibility in
part on the reputational effects of litigation, offering as an “admittedly extreme example” BP’s
willingness to provide $20 billion in compensation for the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Id. The
choice of this example may be telling. There is little indication that antitrust defendants in private
litigation suffer any significant cost in terms of their reputation, and so it is perhaps no accident that
Woodbury did not offer a more directly relevant example to make his point. More generally,
however, in this Article we do not attempt to determine whether antitrust violations on the whole are
insufficiently or excessively deterred. Our aim is to establish a proposition that is more limited,
although one that still defies conventional wisdom: that private enforcement probably serves as a
greater deterrent to antitrust violations than criminal enforcement by the DOJ. A demonstration that
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Part II of this Article analyzes the deterrence effects of DOJ anticartel efforts by studying DOJ cases filed from 1990 to 2007. Part III
compares these results to the cumulative deterrence effects of a sample
of forty large private cases that ended during this same period. (We do
not compare the DOJ with the deterrence effects of every private case
filed during this period, however, because we were unable to obtain this
information).
Before coming to any policy conclusions based on this comparison,
we address some criticisms of private enforcement. Few commentators
dispute that most DOJ anti-cartel prosecutions involved anticompetitive
conduct or that most DOJ cartel cases should have been brought. But are
most private enforcement cases legitimate? Do most involve
anticompetitive behavior? Considering the widespread criticism within
the profession of private enforcement, and that most successful private
cases result only in settlements, do these cases mostly involve underlying
anticompetitive conduct? We address this topic in Part IV, concluding
that the evidence suggests the legal actions on which we rely did indeed
entail claims with merit. Part V then acknowledges some qualifications
and caveats to the quantitative conclusions of this Article.
Finally, Part VI concludes by offering policy suggestions that follow
from our analysis. Our results demonstrate that private enforcement most
certainly has crucial deterrence effects. These effects are so important
that U.S. courts should not continue their steps to curtail private
enforcement, and foreign jurisdictions should consider permitting private
enforcement of competition laws as a complement to government efforts.
II. DETERRENCE FROM DOJ ANTI-CARTEL CASES
The DOJ Antitrust Division can attempt to deter illegal cartel activity
in several ways. First, it can request that courts fine the corporations
involved. Second, it can request that the most culpable individuals be
fined. Third, it can and occasionally does ask for restitution. Fourth, it
can request that some of the individuals involved be imprisoned or
placed under house arrest.10 The Division also can secure injunctions to
restore competition to the affected markets. Since we know of no way to
private enforcement helps the law to more closely approximate optimal deterrence is a project for
another day.
10. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 1999–2008, 13
n.14, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/242359.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2010) (The term other
confinement “[i]ncludes house arrest or confinement to a halfway house or community treatment
center.”).
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value these injunctions, however, or to compare them to injunctions
secured by private parties, we have omitted them from our analysis.11
A. Optimal Deterrence of Cartels
The most generally accepted approach to optimally deterring
antitrust violations was developed by Professor William Landes,12 who
convincingly showed that to achieve optimal13 deterrence,14 the total
amount of the sanctions imposed against an antitrust violator should be
equal to the violation’s expected “net harm to others,” divided by the
probability of detection and proof of the violation.15 Moreover, because

11. Additionally, DOJ cases often set important legal precedents that can deter
anticompetitive conduct significantly. We do not know how to value these precedents, however, or
to compare their value to the value of precedents established through private enforcement. For an
excellent analysis of this topic, see Stephen Calkins, Coming to Praise Criminal Antitrust
Enforcement,
EUROPEAN
UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE
(June
2006),
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/Competition/2006(pdf)/200610-COMPedCalkins. pdf. Calkins
found that of leading antitrust cases decided before 1977, twelve were private and twenty-seven
were government. Of the leading cases decided in 1977 or later, however, he found thirty private
cases and only fifteen government cases. Id. at 12, 14 (sample taken from the leading cases printed
in the leading antitrust casebook). Calkins concluded:
Today what is known as U.S. antitrust law no longer is exclusively or even principally
the consequence of Justice Department [or FTC or State] enforcement. The leading
modern cases on monopolization, attempted monopolization, joint ventures, proof of
agreement; boycott; other horizontal restraints of trade, resale price maintenance,
territorial restraints, vertical boycott claims, tying, price discrimination, jurisdiction, and
exemptions are almost all the result of litigation brought by someone other than the
Justice Department [or the FTC or the States].
Id. at 13 (citations omitted).
12. William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 652
(1983). Landes built upon concepts developed in Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An
Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968), by applying them to the antitrust field.
13. The goal is optimal deterrence, not complete deterrence, because enforcement aggressive
enough to deter all cartels is likely to unduly penalize honest business conduct. Therefore a proper
balance must be struck to achieve optimal deterrence.
14. Professor Landes was not concerned with compensating victims. For an analysis that
takes victim compensation into account, see Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust “Treble” Damages
Really Single Damages?, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 115, 161–68 (1993), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1134822.
15. See Landes, supra note 12, at 657. If the harm was ten and the probability of detection
and proof .333, since (10/.333 = 30), the optimal penalty for this violation would be 30. This ignores
risk aversion and other factors. See id. Analysts of both the Chicago and post-Chicago schools of
antitrust have almost universally accepted these principles. See Lande, supra note 14, at 125–26.
Despite the general acknowledgement of the superiority of the Landes approach, however, many
respected scholars and enforcers instead focus upon the gain to the lawbreaker, perhaps because it is
simpler to calculate. For an insightful analysis, see Wouter P.J. Wils, Optimal Antitrust Fines:
Theory and Practice, 29 WORLD COMPETITION 183, 190–93 (2006).
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not every cartel is detected or successfully sanctioned, the “net harm to
others” from cartels should be multiplied by a number that is larger than
one (the multiplier should be the inverse of the probability of detection
and proof).16 In other words, the optimal penalty = (harms) ÷
(probability of detection x probability of proof).
In applying Landes’s model, we will undertake several important
steps that warrant noting. First, we will attempt to compare financial
penalties imposed on corporations with similar penalties imposed on the
individual corporate actors who are personally responsible for an
antitrust violation. Second, we will attempt to compare financial
penalties with time in prison (or time spent under house arrest).
Of course, making these comparisons in an objective, accurate, and
non-controversial manner is not possible. The conventional wisdom
seems to be that fines are superior to prison as a way to secure optimal
deterrence.17 However, one might argue, to put the points in their
strongest form, that corporate actors care only about their own financial
well-being and that prison sentences are so abhorrent18 that no corporate

16. Unfortunately, this is often difficult to determine:
Of course, no one knows the percentage of cartels that are detected and proven. In 1986,
the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Douglas Ginsburg (AAG Ginsburg),
estimated that the enforcers detected no more than 10% of all cartels. There are reasons to
believe that the Antitrust Division’s amnesty program has resulted in a larger percentage
of cartels detected and proven today, but there is anecdotal evidence that, despite the
enforcers’ superb efforts, many cartels still operate. From an optimal deterrence
perspective it would be necessary to know the percentage of cartels that are detected and
proven to know what number to multiply the “net harms to others” by. At a minimum,
however, we know that if the combined antitrust sanctions only total the actual damages,
firms would be significantly undeterred from committing antitrust violations.
Ideally, optimal deterrence should be based upon the expectations of potential price
fixers, not the results of their price-fixing or the actual fines imposed. To ascertain this,
however, we would have to interview a random sample of potential price fixers and
discern their expectations. In reality, however, it would be impossible to assemble a
proper random sample or to get them to respond candidly.
John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, How High Do Cartels Raise Prices? Implications for Optimal
Cartel Fines, 80 TUL. L. REV. 513, 519–20 (2005) (citations omitted).
17. The conventional wisdom in the field was well summarized by V.S. Khanna, Corporate
Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it Serve, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1534 (1996) (“Thus,
some justification for corporate criminal liability may have existed in the past, when civil
enforcement techniques were not well developed, but from a deterrence perspective, very little now
supports the continued imposition of criminal rather than civil liability on corporations.”).
18. See Gregory J. Werden, Sanctioning Cartel Activity: Let the Punishment Fit the Crime, 5
EUR. COMPETITION J. 19, 31 (2009); Donald I. Baker & Barbara A. Reeves, The Paper Label
Sentences: Critiques, 86 YALE L.J. 619, 621 (1977) (“Experience supports the conclusion that
businessmen view prison as uniquely unpleasant and that therefore incarceration is a uniquely
effective deterrent.”); Arthur L. Liman, The Paper Label Sentences: Critiques, 86 YALE L.J. 630,
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actor would be willing to risk prison, no matter how large the financial
gain (or, to put the point somewhat differently, that a corporate actor
would be willing to pay virtually any amount of money to avoid the risk
of prison).19
The extreme form of these arguments is unpersuasive. Corporate
actors do in fact risk their own prison time for the financial benefit of
their employers when they violate the antitrust laws—by, for example,
participating in price fixing. Moreover, the literature on antitrust law
generally assumes that corporations maximize profits, which means that
it also assumes the interests of corporate representatives and corporations
generally align.20 Any other approach would greatly complicate antitrust

630–31 (1977) (“To the businessman . . . prison is the inferno, and conventional risk-reward analysis
breaks down when the risk is jail.”).
19. Baker & Reeves, supra note 18, at 621–22. Note the important difference in these two
baselines: a corporate actor might demand a different sum to risk prison than they would be willing
to pay to avoid the risk of prison. For example, suppose someone would rather pay a $2 million fine
than be imprisoned for one year. How would that person react to the question of whether they would
accept $2 million in return to going to prison for one year? They might not agree to this deal. Part of
the difference is the relative wealth of the actor in the two situations. A corporate actor can demand
an unlimited amount to accept the risk of prison. And any such payment increases his or her wealth.
But the same person cannot pay an unlimited amount to avoid the risk of prison. She can only spend
as much money as she has or can borrow. See David Cohen & Jack L. Knetsch, Judicial Choice and
Disparities Between Measures of Economic Values, in CHOICES, VALUES AND FRAMES 424, 428
(Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000). But there is another element at play here as well.
Empirical evidence shows that people’s attitudes toward costs and benefits depend on their
perception of the status quo. Id. at 428–29. A person who accepts prison as the status quo may be
willing to pay less to avoid it than a person who sees prison as a deviation from the status quo. A
corollary is that, depending on the odds and stakes, people value avoiding losses—and are willing to
take risks to do so—far more than they value gains—which they generally will not take risks to
obtain (although, oddly, this principle may vary depending on the odds of the risk and the size of the
gain or loss). See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
under Risk, in CHOICES, VALUES AND FRAMES 35–36 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds.,
2000). This psychological phenomenon—and others—greatly complicates an economic analysis of
behavior. So, for example, a corporate actor who perceives herself as taking steps that violate the
antitrust law to return to the status quo (perhaps because she thinks her corporation is suffering from
unfair competition) may be far more tolerant of risk than the same corporate actor who contemplates
the same measure as a means of obtaining a perceived economic advantage. Even for a single
corporate actor, then, there may be no single correct amount that represents her willingness to trade
off between gain for her corporation and the risk of prison for herself.
20. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW ix (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter, POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW] (arguing that his brand of economic analysis of antitrust law has come to
predominate judicial doctrine, with a consensus that “business firms should be assumed to be
rational profit maximizers, so that the issue in evaluating the antitrust significance of a particular
business practice should be whether it is a means by which a rational profit maximizer can increase
its profits at the expense of efficiency”). See also Richard A. Posner, Optimal Sentences for WhiteCollar Crime, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 409, 417–18 & n.27 (1980) [hereinafter Posner, Optimal
Sentences] (acknowledging that he has made “an argument . . . in the antitrust context for confining

321

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1/31/2013 3:27 PM

2011

analysis, requiring an inquiry not only into the market and its participants
but also into the internal workings of particular corporations. Indeed,
there is an odd—and usually unexplained—inconsistency when
proponents of the free market claim that corporations should not be
subject to civil liability for the wrongdoing of their representatives: if the
free market works in the sense that corporations respond in an efficient
manner to market incentives, including by encouraging corporate
representatives to act for the benefit of the corporation, why shouldn’t
the same be true of legal sanctions?21
The work of Richard Posner provides a useful illustration. He
addresses—and rejects—the twin concerns about correlating financial
penalties to corporations with prison terms for corporate representatives:
(1) that corporate representatives have different interests than
corporations and (2) that prison time cannot be equated with a monetary
sum. The first issue involves a potential divergence of interests between
principal and agent, which economists tend to call agency costs. Posner’s
response:
A corporation has effective methods of preventing its employees from
committing acts that impose huge [antitrust] liabilities on it. A sales
manager whose unauthorized participation in a paltry price-fixing
scheme resulted in the imposition of a $1 million fine on his employer
would thereafter, I predict, have great difficulty finding responsible
employment, and this prospect should be sufficient to deter.22

In other words, corporations can and will impose incentives that align
their interests and the interests of their representatives.

criminal (or civil-penalty) liability to the corporation, on the theory that if it is liable it will find
adequate ways of imposing on its employees the costs to it of violating the law”) (citing RICHARD A.
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 225–26 (1976)). The same is true for
scholars of a similar ilk in the field of securities. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 4 (1996) (“Managers may do their best to take
advantage of their investors, but they find that the dynamics of the market drive them to act as if they
had investors’ interests at heart. It is almost as if there were an invisible hand.”).
21. See, e.g., Christopher D. Stone, Sentencing the Corporation, 71 B.U. L. REV. 383, 385
(1991) (“While it is true that managers have a hard time getting the rank and file to adapt to market
threats, no one suggests that corporations are so hidebound or so buffered from their capital
environments that market penalties must be ruinously high before the company will respond. Why
should it be otherwise with legal penalties?”).
22. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 20, at 271. But see John Collins Coffee, Jr.,
Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Non-Chicago View of the Economics of Criminal Sanctions, 17
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 419, 458–59 (1980) (noting examples of limited internal sanctions imposed
against individuals responsible for antitrust violations).
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Posner has also addressed the second issue—the concern that prison
time cannot be correlated to financial penalties. He has argued for “the
substitution, whenever possible, of the fine (or civil penalty) for the
prison sentence as the punishment for crime.”23 His contention is,
particularly in cases of “white collar” crime,24 that “fining the affluent
offender is preferable to imprisoning him from society’s standpoint
because it is less costly and no less efficacious.”25 As he notes, “The fine
[or civil liability] for a white-collar crime can be set at whatever level
imposes the same disutility on the defendant, and thus yield the same
deterrence, as the prison sentence that would have been imposed
instead.”26
Thus skeptics of private enforcement with a Chicago school
orientation—including Posner himself27—should not rely on agency
costs or the inherent superiority of prison as a deterrent to reject an effort
to compare the deterrence effects of private enforcement and criminal
prosecutions.28

23. Posner, Optimal Sentences, supra note 20, at 409.
24. Id. at 409–10 (defining “white collar” crime).
25. Id. at 410.
26. Id. Posner is familiar with resistance to this claim—indeed, his article responds in part to
a sophisticated criticism by John Coffee that contends that “the threat of imprisonment is inherently
greater than that of a fine,” id. at 413 (citing Coffee, supra note 22), or, presumably, civil liability.
Posner usefully distills Coffee’s argument to three points: (1) financial penalties work only if the
culpable party has the means to pay them; (2) fines themselves work only if backed by a sufficient
penalty for non-payment (otherwise they will not be paid); and (3) culpable parties are likely to
experience an increasing marginal loss of utility as fines get larger (at least up until the point that
they have no money left), but a decreasing marginal loss of utility as prison sentences grow in
length. Id. at 413–14. The first two points have only limited significance for our Article:
corporations generally can pay the damages they owe and courts have methods of making them do
so, including mulcting them with sanctions for contempt. But Coffee’s point about the potentially
complicated relationship between financial penalties and prison time does suggest that any ratio
between prison time and money will be an imperfect approximation.
27. See, e.g., POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 20, at 274–75. Posner’s concern about
antitrust class actions is particularly curious. He levels two criticisms: first, that class action lawyers
have incentive to settle cases for relatively small amounts compared to their actual worth and,
second, that risk-averse corporations may settle claims for too much because of an unlikely
possibility of an extraordinarily large loss. Id. at 275. Posner does not address the fact that these
tendencies—if real—are off-setting.
28. Indeed, Posner even suggests what he believes to be a feasible method for estimating the
trade-off between years in prison and monetary sanctions:
[A] promising method would be to infer statistically the relative deterrent effect of fine
and prison. Suppose that in one federal district the average fine for a federal white-collar
offense is $1,000 and the average prison term 30 days, and in another district it is $800
and 40 days, and so forth. Then, by comparing the incidence of the offenses across
districts, we should be able to infer the rate of exchange at which days in jail translate
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More plausible points are that a financial penalty against an
individual has more of an impact than a similar penalty against a
corporation and that one year of prison time is equivalent to a relatively
large financial penalty. We make accommodations for these plausible
assumptions in our analysis infra by tripling the disvalue or deterrence
effects of individual sanctions relative to corporate sanctions.29
Perhaps optimal deterrence can only be secured by a mix of
corporate and individual sanctions. If only corporations were subject to
penalties, individuals might be unduly tempted to form cartels if, as has
been suggested by some research,30 they did not face significant internal
sanctions for their illegal behavior31 or an appropriate diminution of their
into dollars of fine with no loss of deterrence. (A study of state white-collar prosecutions,
conducted along similar lines, might also be feasible.) Since no such study has been
attempted, I cannot evaluate the difficulties it might encounter arising, for example,
because the incidence of many white-collar crimes (e.g., price-fixing conspiracies) is
unknown, or the gravity of the crime may vary across districts or states, which affects the
optimal sentence. Such a study might not produce results entitled to great confidence.
Nevertheless, supplemented by the intuition that guides judges today in devising fineprison “packages” to impose on white collar offenders, such a study should provide a
close enough approximation of the actual fine-prison trade-off that we need not fear that
by substituting fines for prison sentences in white-collar cases we would be drastically
altering the expected punishment cost, and hence the level, of white-collar crime.
Posner, Optimal Sentences, supra note 20, at 413. We know of no study along these lines. And, of
course, the analysis assumes that compliance with antitrust law depends primarily, perhaps even
exclusively, on the incentives created by money or prison. Cf. Stone, supra note 21, at 389 (arguing
that the “moral responsibility” to obey the law explains the compliance of many corporate actors).
29. We readily acknowledge that our decision to triple the deterrence effects of the individual
penalties relative to corporate penalties was arbitrary.
A critic of private enforcement could argue that even a very large amount of money paid
by the corporation is meaningless from a deterrence perspective—that managers could care less how
much money their corporations pay. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn, No Body to
Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386,
393 (1981). They could argue that only individual fines and prison matter at all from a deterrence
perspective, so private enforcement does not deter anything. Of course, this view contradicts the
basic assumption that corporations are profit maximizers. Surely corporations do not like paying
millions or billions of dollars, so there must be some deterrence from private cases. Moreover, the
individuals responsible for this liability are likely to have their careers detrimentally affected when
their actions require their corporation to pay large sums in private cases. See POSNER, ANTITRUST
LAW, supra note 20, at 271 (arguing that causing a corporation to suffer financial losses will harm
careers of employees); cf. Coffee, supra note 22, at 458–59 (providing examples of corporate
representatives violating the law to the detriment of the corporation but not suffering adverse
consequences). For these reasons, while correlating financial penalties to corporations with prison
time to corporate representatives is tricky, it seems to overstate the case to suggest there is no
correlation whatsoever.
30. See Coffee, supra note 22, at 458–59.
31. Greg Werden suggests additional reasons: “This can occur as a result of defects in the
design of compensation schemes, especially if the executives have short time horizons or are more
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future income. On the other hand, if only individual penalties existed, it
could be in the interests of some corporations to establish internal
incentives that failed to discourage, rewarded, or even coerced
employees into engaging in illegal behavior.32 Some corporations might
prefer to offer up a few executives for multi-year prison terms rather than
pay $100 million or more in a criminal fine or payout in private
litigation.33 In light of these complexities, this Article will use a total
deterrence approach and will determine the sum of individual and
corporate deterrence. As noted earlier, our analysis will make
accommodations for these complexities and agency-principal problems
by tripling the disvalue or deterrence effects of individual sanctions
relative to corporate sanctions. With these qualifications in place, we can
begin our analysis by addressing the deterrence effect of the DOJ’s
enforcement of the antitrust laws.
B. Deterrence from DOJ Cartel Fines and Restitution
The Antitrust Division has successfully prosecuted hundreds of
cartels. While it is of course impossible to determine how many cartels
were never formed due to the prospect of penalties resulting from
investigations (i.e., how much deterrence the Antitrust Division’s cases
were responsible for), surely it is significant. We are of course unable to
quantify the actual deterrence from the DOJ’s efforts. We can, however,
quantify various DOJ remedies—corporate fines, individual fines,
restitution, and imprisonment—out of our belief that on average the
corporations and individuals involved will tend to respond rationally to
these sanctions, and that heavy sanctions will tend to discourage cartel
formation.

willing than business enterprises to take risks. Consequently, business enterprises can incur
substantial costs in monitoring their executives and complying with the law.” See Werden, supra
note 18, at 32–33 (footnotes omitted).
32. Id. at 32.
33. Suppose that, instead of a corporate fine or payouts in private cases, a corporation could
offer up to the Department of Justice five executives who would each be sentenced to three years in
prison. Suppose the corporation could pay each of the individuals involved $2 million per executive
per year by depositing the appropriate sums in Swiss bank accounts. This would only cost the
corporation $30 million, far less than many of the larger fines that have been imposed in recent
years, and less than the private payouts in every one of the cases studied by the authors in their
sample of private cases.
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The total of the corporate fines imposed in every DOJ criminal
antitrust case from 1990 to 2007 has been $4.167 billion.34 The total of
the individual fines imposed in these cases has been $67 million.35
During this same period, the Antitrust Division has also secured
restitution of $118 million in conjunction with criminal antitrust cases.36
This largely or totally consists of restitution to the federal government
for the overcharges it paid to price fixers. As the Division’s Workload
Statistics notes with considerable understatement, “[f]requently
restitution is not sought in criminal antitrust cases, as damages are
obtained through treble damage actions filed by the victims.”37
C. Deterrence Effects of Prison and House Arrest
DOJ prosecutions also result in prison sentences and house arrests,
which significantly deter illegal activity as well. From 1990 to 2007
criminal prosecutions by the DOJ Antitrust Division resulted in
sentences that total 330.24 years in prison.38 In addition, Antitrust
Division activity also led to another 96.85 years of “house arrest or
confinement to a halfway house or community treatment center.”39
However, these figures might be somewhat inaccurate for the purposes at
hand for two reasons.
First, these figures are for time sentenced, not time served. We were
unable to determine how much of this time actually was served or how
often sentences were reduced.
Second, sometimes an investigation by the Antitrust Division results
in a sentence for an unrelated or marginally related crime, regardless of
whether an antitrust violation was uncovered. Unrelated crimes can
include perjury, mail fraud, contempt, obstruction of justice, and false
statements.40 Since the Antitrust Division uncovered these crimes, often
Antitrust Division investigators are in the best position to pursue these
issues, even though they are not antitrust violations. They often do so

34. See infra Table 1.
35. See infra Table 2.
36. See infra Table 3.
37. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 12 n.13.
38. See infra Table 4. We define one year as equal to 365.25 days.
39. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 13; see also infra Table 5.
40. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 8 (listing these crimes under the header “Other
Criminal Cases”).
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but, unfortunately, we have not been able to find out how frequently this
occurs.41
For simplicity, we are ignoring these issues. The figures reported
above for prison time and house arrest therefore will be used in our
subsequent analysis even though they are larger than they should be. As
such, these unadjusted estimates will overestimate the probable
deterrence effect of the DOJ anti-cartel program to some extent.Using
these figures, how could we fairly value—or disvalue—time spent in
prison or under house arrest? Since no one wants to spend any time in
prison or under house arrest, should we disvalue it infinitely and assume
that even a small probability of spending any time in prison or under
house arrest has an infinite deterrence value?
No. People do not act as if they infinitely disvalue the risk of getting
put into prison or placed under house arrest for an antitrust offense. If
they did, they would never try to form a cartel because this would put
them at risk of getting caught and sentenced. Rather, potential offenders
appear to tolerate the risk of prison. Perhaps they calculate, at least to
some very rough degree, their apparent chances of getting caught and the
prison sentence, house arrest, or fine they are likely to face. They then
balance this chance of a penalty, again in an extremely rough way,
against the rewards of cartelization. In any case, they often decide to
form cartels. We know they often make this decision because cartelists
surely know cartels are illegal, yet the number of cartels caught in recent
years has been quite significant and does not seem to be decreasing.42

41. Sometimes these other crimes are related to an antitrust offense—such as when a cartel
bribes a federal purchasing agent. Other times they are not. Often they are very difficult to classify.
According to the DOJ, “Other Federal Crimes such as Perjury, Mail Fraud, Contempt, Obstruction of
Justice, or False Statements” have constituted 16% of their criminal convictions since 1990 (23% in
recent years, when prison sentences have been longer). Id.
42. The continued high number of DOJ grand juries, and the recent DOJ success rate in the
courts, is evidence that many cartels still exist. As of the close of FY 2007, the DOJ had
approximately 135 pending grand jury investigations. Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant
Attorney Gen. for Criminal Enforcement, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address at the 56th Annual Spring
Meeting of the Dep’t of Justice: Recent Developments, Trends, and Milestones In the Antitrust
Division’s Criminal Enforcement Program 2 (Mar. 26, 2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public /speeches/232716.pdf. Between 2000 and 2009, the DOJ filed
anywhere from thirty-two to seventy-two criminal cases per year, most of which resulted in
convictions. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 2000–2009
4, 9 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/ workload-statistics.pdf (last visited Feb.
24, 2011). The following table, extracted from this data, shows the DOJ’s success in prosecuting
antitrust violations:
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From 1990–2007, 550 people were sentenced to prison or house arrest as
a result of 958 successful Antitrust Division cases.43 Moreover, the large
number of cartels discovered in recent years may be evidence that the
current overall level of cartel sanctions is too low.
Thus, in theory we can establish a non-infinite value for the disutility
of prison time. To do this in practice is, of course, extremely difficult and
speculative. There is no one objective way to compare the deterrence
effect of time spent in prison to the deterrence effect of a criminal fine
because different people would trade off jail versus fines in different
ways. Any “average” figure used to equate the two is necessarily
imprecise and arbitrary.
We will undertake three different approaches to this issue. We hope
that this Article’s use of three approaches will increase the reliability of
its results.

Total Criminal
Cases

‘00

‘01

‘02

‘03

‘04

‘05

‘06

‘07

‘08

‘09

Filed

63

44

33

41

42

32

34

40

54

72

Won

52

38

37

32

35

36

31

31

47

67

Lost

-

2

1

1

1

1

-

1

4

2

Pending

35

39

34

42

48

43

44

54

57

60

Appeal
Decisions

-

5

1

2

7

4

5

1

4

2

Grand Juries
Initiated

26

26

26

48

21

38

38

34

32

38

It seems clear that, in the opinion of a large number of judges, grand juries, and juries, the DOJ
Antitrust Division has been bringing a large number of meritorious anti-cartel cases in recent years.
Note that in some years the DOJ won more cases than it filed because the cases the DOJ won in any
given year were often filed in an earlier year.
43. These 958 cases could be the total for both individual and corporate cases. If so, this
figure would be significantly overcounting the “true” number of cartel offenses. According to the
DOJ’s statistics, during this period 864 individuals were charged, as were 678 corporations. All
totals for the years 1990–2007 were calculated by adding the yearly totals as reported in the U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 1990–1998 (on file with
author) and the U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 10.
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1. Valuations of lives and years of life for other regulatory, public policy
purposes
The valuation of one year of life “loss” in prison, or due to house
arrest, is similar to one that, regrettably, society often must undertake for
any number of public policy purposes. Sometimes a life must even be
valued at an amount that is less than infinity. For example, our nation
cannot afford perfect safety and we do not want every automobile to be
built as safely as possible because society cannot afford this. Similarly,
even though a life is beyond value and society does not want people to
drive negligently, courts do not award infinite damages for the loss of
life in car crashes.
On average, studies that value lives in the United States for public
policy purposes—e.g., when agencies set product safety, transportation,
safety, or environmental requirements—typically arrive at values
between $3 million and $10 million per life.44 By contrast, lower figures,
on average between $1.4 million and $3.8 million, are awarded in
wrongful death cases.45 Other studies analyze the data slightly differently
by attempting to place a value on one year of life. They calculate figures
in the range of an average of $300,000 to $500,000 per person per year
of life (depending upon a number of variables).46 It is likely that most
people would prefer the prospect of spending one year in prison to the
prospect of losing one year of life; after all, many prisoners with no
chance at parole still resist the death penalty.
Thus, in theory we can establish a non-infinite value for the disutility
of prison time. To do this in practice is extremely difficult and
speculative. While there is no way to directly value the deterrence effect
44. See Joseph E. Aldy & W. Kip Viscusi, Adjusting the Value of a Statistical Life for Age
and Cohort Effects, 90 REV. ECON & STAT. 573, 579 (2008). Recently the Department of
Transportation has used $5.8 million for the value of a life. Memorandum from Tyler D. Duvall,
Assistant Sec’y for Transp. Policy, U.S. Dep’t of Transp. & D. J. Gribbin, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t
of Transp. to Secretarial Officers & Modal Adm’rs, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., available at
http://ostpxweb.ost.dot.gov/policy/reports/080205.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2011). The
Environmental Protection Agency currently uses $6.9 million. All Things Considered: Value on Life
11 Percent Lower Than 5 Years Ago (NPR radio broadcast July 11, 2008), available at http://
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=92470116.
45. See Mark A. Cohen & Ted R. Miller, “Willingness to Award” Nonmonetary Damages
and the Implied Value of Life from Jury Awards, 23 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 165, 166, 179 (2003)
(calculations made in 1995 dollars).
46. See Aldy & Viscusi, supra note 44, at 4. These figures are lower for older people. Id. A
study by Stanford researchers calculated only $129,000 per year. Kathleen Kingsbury, The Value of
Human
Life:
$129,000,
TIME.COM
(May
20,
2008),
http://
www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1808049,00.html.
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of prison time, a conservative alternative is to assume that people would
disvalue one year in prison the same as they would disvalue one year’s
worth of life. This means the above results, which calculated the average
value of one year of life to be worth $300,000 to $500,000 per year,
should be assumed to be roughly equal to the average disvalue of one
year in prison. Moreover, one year of house arrest should be disvalued at
a significantly lower figure.
2. Awards made by the September 11th Victims Compensation Fund
Following the September 11th tragedy, Congress created the
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund (“the Fund”) to award
compensation to victims’ families.47 Kenneth Feinberg was appointed
Special Master and charged with deciding the appropriate amounts of
compensation.48 The Fund sought to avoid a “complex adversarial
process” while still honoring fairness and consistency.49 The Fund’s
payments thus constitute a prominent reflection of the monetary value
our society places on innocent human life, even though these payouts
were made under unique circumstances.50 Significantly, the victims
include a large number of middle class and upper class people who, at
least in terms of their income and status as corporate executives, are
likely to be roughly comparable to incarcerated price fixers.

47. See Air Transportation Safety and Stabilization Act, 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2006)
[hereinafter “the Act”] (we are grateful to Thomas Weaver for his research involving the September
11th Victim Compensation Fund).
48. See generally 1 KENNETH R. FEINBERG ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER
FOR THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 1–4 (2004) [hereinafter
“FEINBERG REPORT”], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/final_report.pdf .
49. See id. at 6. Congress mandated a “hybrid” compensation system. Like the tort system,
Congress required the Special Master to consider economic and non-economic loss. However, unlike
the tort system, the Special Master could not consider issues of liability or punitive damages, and the
Special Master was required to reduce awards by payments from certain collateral sources. Id. A
larger purpose of the Act was to save the airline industry from collapse and to protect the American
economy from the consequences of that collapse by creating an alternative to direct litigation against
the airlines. See id. at 3; see also generally Air Transportation Safety and Stabilization Act, 49
U.S.C. § 40101 (2000).
50. The Special Master extensively researched “theories of compensation and methodologies
for the calculation of economic loss, as well as the various state laws governing wrongful death
actions,” and met with “numerous economists, experts and actuaries, both in the private sector and in
the federal government” as to the calculation of economic loss and determinations on collateral
sources. Between issuing its interim and final regulations, the Fund reviewed and sought to integrate
“2,687 timely comments” on issues that ranged from the technical and specific, to fundamental
questions regarding the larger purpose and policy of the Fund. See FEINBERG, supra note 48, at 4–5.
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The Fund’s average award was $2,082,035 for damages to the direct
victims of the terrorist attack, plus an average offset for collateral
payments (damages to family members) of $855,826, for a total average
award of $2,937,861. The median award was $1,677,632. The maximum
award was $7,100,000, and the minimum award was $250,000.51
Many of the September 11th victims had been quite affluent,
including eighty-nine whose annual income had been between $500,000
and $1,000,000 per year (their estates were given average awards of
$4,749,654), and eight victims whose annual income exceeded
$4,000,000 per year (their estates were given average awards of
$6,379,287).52 Although we do not know the average or typical preconviction annual incomes of imprisoned price fixers, we would not be
surprised if the amounts were comparable.
3. Awards in wrongful imprisonment cases
Another approach to approximating the disutility of prison or house
arrest time imposed for antitrust violations comes from examining the
disvalue society places on prison time in a very different context: the
compensation provided to people who have been wrongly imprisoned.
Sometimes people are wrongly sentenced to prison in a miscarriage of
justice by, for example, perjured testimony.53 The victims potentially can
recover for a variety of torts, depending upon the jurisdiction.54 They can
receive compensatory damages, emotional damages, punitive damages,
or some combination thereof.55 Many of these situations involve suits
51. Id. at 110 tbl.12.
52. See infra Table 6.
53. See Limone v. United States, 497 F. Supp. 2d. 143, 152 (D. Mass. 2007) (FBI was aware
chief witness would perjure himself); see also Newsome v. McCabe 319 F.3d 301, 304–05 (7th Cir.
2003) (officers induced eyewitnesses to falsely identify plaintiff); Bravo v. Giblin, No. B125242,
2002 WL 31547001 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2002) (investigating officer fabricated evidence). The
authors are grateful to Thomas Weaver for locating and analyzing these cases, and for performing
research on this subject. See Thomas Weaver, The Part That Counts: Wrongful Incarceration Awards
and the Value of Human Life (unpublished manuscript) (May 2010) (on file with the authors).
54. These torts include wrongful imprisonment, wrongful conviction, wrongful confinement,
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress,
false arrest, or an unconstitutional depravation of their civil rights. See infra Appendix II, Table A.
55. “Losses of this magnitude are almost impossible to catalogue. The loss of liberty. The
loss of the enjoyment of their families. The loss of the ability to care for and nurture their children.
The loss of intimacy and closeness with their spouses. Indeed, the task of quantifying these losses—
which I am obliged to do—is among the most difficult this Court has ever had to undertake. Where
triers of fact must assign values to the intangible and invaluable, they may look to the values
assigned by other fact-finders in the past. I do not blindly follow other awards, but I do look to them
for perspective and as an indication of how society has valued these harms. I note also that damage
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against governmental actors, and sometimes the maximum awards in
these cases are fixed by statute.56 Other times a suit is brought as a
common law tort case. Often no award will be given for imprisonment
due to a simple, albeit tragic, error; some type of intentional act, malice,
or malfeasance is required.57
We have located payments made in a total of nineteen wrongful
imprisonment cases.58 The highest payment we found for a case
involving at least one year of prison was $1.165 million per year, for
three years of wrongful confinement for a false conviction.59 However,
when shorter imprisonments are annualized, significantly higher figures
sometimes resulted.60 By contrast, the lowest payment we found
compensated the wrongfully imprisoned person at the rate of only
$23,529 per year.61 The 75th percentile of these nineteen awards is
approximately $1,000,000 per year; the 25th percentile is approximately
and suffering do not accrue smoothly and proportionally on a monthly or annual basis. Some injury
occurs all in a rush at the start—the shock and horror of arrest and conviction—while other injury
only begins to compound after a significant period of time has passed—the setting in of despair, or
the withering of relationships. I consider the particular story of this case and these plaintiffs’
suffering.” Limone, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 243.
56. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2513 (West 2010).
57. See, e.g., supra examples accompanying note 55.
58. See infra Appendix II, Table A.
59. Bravo v. Giblin, No. B125242, 2002 WL 31547001 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2002). Suit
filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 yielded “damages in the amount of $221,976 for his economic losses,
$3,537,000 to compensate him for 1,179 days of incarceration at the rate of $3,000 per day, and $1
million to compensate him for emotional distress suffered between the date of the incident and the
date of his sentencing.” Id. at *24. We arrived at the award per year of imprisonment of
$1,138,951.77 in this case by multiplying $3,000 a day by 365.25 to arrive at $1,095,750. The lost
earnings of $221,976, divided by 1,179 days in prison and multiplied by 365.25 days, comes to
$188.28 per day and adds another $68,767.37 per year. The total award per year of imprisonment
thus comes to $1,164,517.37.
60. See id. (investigating officer fabricated evidence) (10-month sentence led to a $9 million
settlement; this is an annual rate of $10,800,000). Because the emotional stress and discomfort could
be disproportionately greater at the beginning of a prison sentence, it is unclear whether the award
would have been increased proportionately if the victim had been imprisoned for one year, or for
multiple years. As noted, in these cases it is difficult to segregate the amounts awarded for false
imprisonment from the amounts awarded for onetime events or other torts. “Where the period of
incarceration is shorter (e.g., less than one year), proportionately larger awards (measured by
annualizing the award) have been rendered, presumably reflecting Limone’s observation that the
injury from incarceration may be more intense towards the beginning.” Smith v. City of Oakland,
538 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1242 (N.D. Cal. 2008); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Corporate Crime and
Punishment: A Non-Chicago View of the Economics of Criminal Sanctions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
419, 431 (1980) (noting that “the declining marginal utility of imprisonment means that each
increment of incarceration increases the perceived penalty by a less than proportionate amount; or,
reduced to its simplest terms, a two-year prison term is not twice as bad as a one-year term”).
61. See Avery v. Manitowoc Co., 428 F. Supp. 2d 891, 893 (E.D. Wis. 2006).
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$140,000 per year.62 We should note, however, that these results are
complicated and may be ambiguous because the cases often also
involved allegations of, and sometimes specific awards for, false arrest,
false conviction, overly harsh interrogation techniques, malicious
prosecution, and other factors.63 Rarely are these awards unambiguously
and solely for false imprisonment.
In addition to the nineteen final awards, we found many others that
were not included in our study because the false imprisonment awards
were too confounded with compensation for the initial arrest or were not
yet final.64 For a variety of reasons, including our small sample size, the
near certainty that our research failed to uncover many cases, the
existence of secret settlements, and the confounding of awards for false
imprisonment with awards for related torts such as intentional infliction
of emotional distress, we present the mean ($1,267,369, which was
significantly affected by two very high annualized awards for
imprisonment of less than one year) and median ($214,286) of these
results with great reluctance. One reason for our hesitation concerns the
income levels of the people involved. We have not been able to ascertain
any of the falsely imprisoned defendants’ incomes, but we suspect most
had a low income. Although some were middle class,65 few or none of
the wrongfully imprisoned people appear to have been corporate
executives or upper-class professionals.66 It is possible that a jury or
judge would award a corporate executive wrongfully imprisoned for
price fixing a larger than average amount for their suffering.67 Still, these
results do tend to show that figures in the neighborhood of $1 million per
year appear generally to be the practical maximum that society is willing
to award for one year wrongfully spent in prison.

62. See infra Appendix II, Table A.
63. For example, one case involved a month in jail and an award of $355,500 for false
imprisonment, as well as “$71,100 for false arrest; $71,100 for intentional infliction of emotional
distress . . . and $213,300 for malicious prosecution.” Jones v. City of Chicago, No. 83C2430, 1987
WL 19800, *1 (N.D. Ill. 1987), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988).
64. For examples, see Weaver, supra note 53.
65. For example, see Newsome v. McCabe, 319 F.3d 301, 307 (7th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff was
an unemployed paralegal, although he testified at trial that he was employed at the time incarceration
began.
66. See Appendix II, Table A.
67. It is possible, however, that a jury might react in the opposite direction. A jury might be
less sympathetic to imprisoned upper-class corporate executives.
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4. Estimates by antitrust scholars
A fourth approach is to assemble and analyze similar estimates by
scholars. We have been able to find only two estimates for the disutility
of one year in prison for an antitrust offense that seem plausible in this
context.68 Both were made by extremely reputable scholars. Both are
roughly consistent with the estimates above.
First, an article by Professors Howard P. Marvel and others equated
one year in jail for price fixing to approximately $600,000 in 2010
dollars.69 Another study by Professor Kenneth Glenn Dau-Schmidt and
others equated one year in jail for price fixing with a fine of $1.5 million
today.70 These figures are higher than the average valuations for one year
of life noted earlier, perhaps because price fixers are wealthier on
average and can afford to disvalue prison time much more than most
people can, or perhaps because price fixers’ time is more valuable on
average.71
5. A conservative resolution of the issue
These four approaches yield estimates that are broadly consistent
with one another. To be conservative, we have taken the highest of these
estimates for the disvalue of one year in prison, $1,500,000 per year, and

68. We have found one other estimate, but it seems to value prison time at an unduly low
level for white-collar criminals. See Tonja Jacobi & Gwendolyn Carroll, Acknowledging Guilt:
Forcing Self-Identification in Post-Conviction DNA Testing, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 263, 283 & n. 52
(2008) (estimating value of prison at approximately $200 per day, which amounts to slightly more
than $70,000 per year).
69. See Howard P. Marvel et al., Price Fixing and Civil Damages: An Economic Analysis,
40 STAN. L. REV. 561, 573 (1988). The authors equated one year in prison with a $300,000 fine. The
article appeared in the February 1988 issue, so we assume they were using 1987 dollars. The Bureau
of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index inflation calculator equates $300,000 in 1987 to $577,825
in 2010. See CPI INFLATION CALCULATOR, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Mar.
17, 2011).
70. Kenneth Glenn Dau-Schmidt et al., Criminal Penalties Under the Sherman Act: A Study
of Law and Economics, in 16 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 25 (Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. ed.,
1994) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id =712721. This article equated
one year in jail with a fine of $1 million. The Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index
inflation calculator equates $1,000,000 in 1994 and $1,431,802 in 2010. See CPI INFLATION
CALCULATOR, supra note 69. Professors Dau-Schmidt et al. were using 1982 data for much of their
paper’s analysis. If they meant their valuation of one year in jail to be expressed in 1982 dollars, then
their $1,000,000 estimate would be the equivalent of $2,198,891 in 2010. Id.
71. Whether the time or the life of a price fixer is more, or less, valuable than that of an
average person is an interesting philosophical question that this Article will not explore.
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arbitrarily increased it to $2 million.72 We will use this as the disvalue or
deterrence equivalent of one year in prison. We will use $1 million for
the disvalue or deterrence equivalent of one year of house arrest. We
note that $2 million is as much as the lowest estimates for the value of a
human life noted earlier. We believe these figures are significantly more
than the average deterrence effect of one year in prison (or, a fortiori, of
one year of house arrest, but we are selecting them so that our
methodology will be conservative and as non-controversial as
possible).73
Using the assumption that a sentence of one year of incarceration has
the same deterrence effect as a $2 million fine, the collective 330.24
years of prison sentences received by antitrust defendants from 1990 to
2007 would be the equivalent of about $660 million in criminal fines.
Using the assumption that a sentence of one year of house arrest has the
same deterrence effect as a $1 million fine, the collective 96.85 years of
house arrest received by antitrust defendants from 1990 to 2007 would
be the equivalent of nearly $97 million in criminal fines. These figures
total about $757 million.
As noted earlier, however, penalties directed against the individuals
involved might well have more of a deterrence effect than penalties
directed against the corporations. To illustrate how this could affect our
analysis, we have trebled the deterrence effect of every individual
penalty before adding them to the corporate penalties. This means using
$6 million for the deterrence value of one year in prison74 and $3 million
for the deterrence value of one year of house arrest, and also trebling the
$67 million in individual penalties.75 Thus, the $757 million calculated
72. We do not believe $2 million is the true cost or deterrent value of one year in prison. We
nevertheless decided to use this figure, which we believe to be unduly high, in our subsequent
analysis in order to take a conservative and relative non-controversial approach to the issue.
73. We note that valuing one year’s worth of life at $2 million would mean that a twenty
year prison sentence would be valued at $40 million, a figure far in excess of the amount that society
places on an individual’s life.
74. We note that valuing one year’s worth of life at $6 million would mean that a twenty year
prison sentence would be valued at $120 million, a figure far in excess of the amount that society
places on an individual’s life.
75. This assumes that the individuals actually pay their own fines. It is, however, difficult to
determine whether the antitrust fines imposed on corporate employees are ultimately paid by the
employees, or are often, or usually, directly or indirectly paid by their employer. This area of law is
exceedingly complex, and, of course, even if indemnification is illegal, this does not mean that it
does not occur regularly. See 1 ROGER MAGNUSON, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION § 9:37 (West
November 2009); Pamela H. Bucey, Corporate Executives Who Have Been Convicted of Crimes: An
Assessment and Proposal, 24 IND. L. REV. 279 (1991); Note, Indemnification of Directors: The
Problems Posed By Federal Securities and Antitrust Legislation, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1403 (1963).
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earlier would be increased to $2.271 billion, and the $67 million in
individual fines would be increased to $201 million. Add to these figures
the $4.166 billion in corporate fines and $118 million in restitution, and
the quantifiable deterrence effect of the Antitrust Division’s remedies
from 1990 to 2007 totals $6.756 billion. If the corporate fines, individual
fines, and restitution figures are converted to 2010 dollars and added to
the $2.271 billion equivalent for prison time and house arrest,76 the total
would be $7.737 billion.
One final note about DOJ enforcement is appropriate. Its record of
overwhelming success suggests the government pursues only very strong
cases. Note, for example, that for the years 1992 to 2008, the DOJ filed
699 cases and won 645 cases.77 This would appear to translate to a
winning rate of over 92%. To be sure, this percentage may be misleading
because the DOJ’s win rate in court is significantly lower.78 Moreover,
the cases filed in a given year generally are not the ones resolved in that
year. Still, such a high success rate demonstrates that the DOJ does not
like to lose. We do not mean this point as a criticism. It may well be
appropriate for the government to bring litigation only if it is very
confident it will win. But that comes at a cost. The DOJ appears much
more willing to tolerate a false negative (a failure to prosecute a violation
of the antitrust laws) than a false positive (litigating a case when in fact
there was no violation). In other words, it appears the DOJ chooses not to
pursue litigation in many meritorious cases, perhaps at least in part
because it lacks the necessary resources. This may well create a need for
private litigation as a complement to government enforcement of the
antitrust laws.79
III. DETERRENCE EFFECTS OF PRIVATE LITIGATION
We know of no information concerning how much defendants have
paid in total as a result of private antitrust litigation during this same or
any other period. We do not even know of extraordinarily rough
estimates.

76. See infra Table 15.
77. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 10.
78. See John M. Connor, Problems with Prison in International Cartel Cases, 56
ANTITRUST BULL. (forthcoming Spring 2011).
79. The ideal proportion of success to failure will depend on a number of variables,
including the relative harms from false negatives and false positives and the likelihood of false
negatives to false positives. A full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
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One extremely low floor on this amount, however, can be obtained
from the Lande/Davis study of forty of the largest private antitrust cases
that ended between 1990 and 2007.80 Our primary screen was that each
case must have returned $50 million or more to victims of antitrust
violations. Actually, they were “alleged” victims because almost all the
cases settled with no finding that defendants had violated the antitrust
laws.81 We did not want to make subjective judgments over whether to
value products at their retail value, their wholesale value, or defendants’
cost. We counted all products as being worth nothing. We did the same
thing for coupons or for discounts because they all have uncertain
redemption rates: all discounts and coupons were counted as zero.82
This study documents between $18 and $19.6 billion in cash paid by
defendants in these forty cases alone. In 2010 dollars, these totals would
be $21.9 billion to $23.9 billion.83 Since this total does not include any
value for the products, discounts, or coupons received in these cases, and
also leaves out defendants’ attorneys’ fees and other litigation costs
(including expert witness fees) and the disruptive effects of the litigation
on corporate efficiency, it understates the actual deterrence from these
cases because all these omitted factors also have deterrence effects.84

80. This was not a cost/benefit analysis of private enforcement. We made no attempt to
assess any of its costs, or all of its benefits. Rather, the main point of this project was to assess those
benefits that easily could be quantified. We did not select a random sample of private cases and
follow them cradle to grave, assessing the merits or lack of merits of each. This would be difficult to
do since almost every private case is dismissed or settled, and for this reason it would be hard to find
out the relevant information about each case. We did not limit ourselves to cases where the Court
found an antitrust violation because these are rare. Only twenty-four final cartel cases calculated an
overcharge since 1890. See Connor & Lande, supra note 16. For a list of cases and their recoveries
see infra Table 7.
81. See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note *, at 891 n.46.
82. We eliminated many cases because they were too difficult to value, even cases valued in
the press at more than $1 billion. Moreover, sometimes it was just not possible to get the necessary
information out of old files or from the preoccupied lawyers possessing the necessary information.
We did not adjust the settlements for inflation by raising them to their present value. Nor
did we subtract attorneys’ fees or other claims administration expenses because, for deterrence
purposes, it does not matter what happened to the money paid by Defendants.
We did not attempt to value injunctive relief, even for those cases where a Court
characterized this relief as being very important. Although injunctions can greatly benefit both
victims and the economy as a whole, we were unable to ascertain an objective and reliable way to
quantify the value of injunctive relief. Neither did we attempt to value the injunctive relief secured
by the DOJ. For more on our methodology, see Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note *, at 889–91.
83. See infra Table 14.
84. As noted earlier, injunctive relief secured by these forty cases also was omitted, further
understating the deterrence value of these cases. However, the effects of injunctive relief secured by
DOJ cases were also excluded.
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In terms of overall deterrence, therefore, these forty private cases
resulted in approximately three times the deterrence of the $7.737 billion
in deterrence produced by every criminal case brought by the DOJ
during this same period in 2010 dollars. As noted earlier, this comparison
is not just to DOJ actions involving these forty private cases; the DOJ
total is for every cartel sanction secured by the Division between 1990
and 2007.
In addition to comparing the probable amount of deterrence from the
recoveries in the forty large private cases to the likely deterrence from
the DOJ sanctions, there are a number of other comparisons that could be
made, such as deterrence from all the DOJ cartel cases to the subsamples
of the forty private cases that were against cartels, or where the DOJ also
obtained relief, or where the DOJ also received a criminal penalty. For
each comparison, the private deterrence is at least as large as the DOJ
deterrence. 85
85. For example, not all of these forty cases were against cartels; some were against
monopolies (although none of the many class actions against Microsoft were included due to data
problems). Using nominal dollars, of the total recoveries of $18 to 19.6 billion, $9.2 to $10.6 billion
was paid in twenty-five cases that were litigated under the per se approach. This sample of twentyfive cases thus excludes payouts by monopolies. Comparing this $9.2 to $10.6 billion to the $6.756
billion in DOJ deterrence calculated earlier shows that these twenty-five private cases alone
probably deterred more anticompetitive behavior than the entire DOJ criminal antitrust enforcement.
Another comparison involves only cases in which the government obtained some sort of
relief. This comparison might appeal to those who praise government action and are skeptical of
private enforcement. They might doubt whether the purely private cases were meritorious. (It is
important to note that, for the reasons discussed in Part III, infra, almost all of the private cases we
included have strong indicia of being meritorious.) As Table 8 reflects, see infra, the plaintiffs in the
twenty-four cases validated by some sort of successful government action recovered between $10.34
and $11.973 billion in nominal dollars. Even the lower of these amounts is over 150% of the $6.756
billion in nominal dollars in deterrence produced by every criminal case brought by DOJ during the
same period.
Yet another interesting comparison is to the thirteen cases in the Lande/Davis sample that
also involved a DOJ action that resulted in a criminal penalty. These thirteen private cases yielded
$5.6 to $7.0 billion in nominal dollar payments, roughly the same as the $6.756 billion DOJ nominal
dollar total. Of course, it could be argued that a better comparison might be limited to the deterrence
effect of the DOJ action in those thirteen cases, rather than all of the DOJ cases from the same time
frame.
Further, the larger, per se sample surely includes some cases that could not have resulted
in criminal penalties, so one could argue that the comparison to only those cases involving criminal
penalties is the fairer one. However, criminal conduct is not the only anticompetitive conduct; so too
is all per se illegal conduct. We should be grateful to the private cases for discouraging any per se
illegal conduct. Finally, DOJ fines must be proven to a criminal standard, while private cases operate
under a civil standard. Perhaps the fairer comparison is, after all, to the deterrence from the sample
of twenty-five per se cases, or to the deterrence from all forty cases. DOJ did little or nothing to
discourage the conduct in many of these non-criminal cases. The only deterrence came from the
private actions.
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Alternatively, one could redo this analysis using different values for
the disincentive effect of one year in jail. For example, instead of our
assumed disvalue of $6 million for one year in prison, one could use a
low estimate of $3 million or a high estimate of $12 million for the
disvalue of one year in prison (i.e., $1 million per month).86 Similarly,
one could use $1.5 million and $6 million estimates for the deterrence
effects of one year of house arrest instead of our $3 million assumption.
Doing this would of course change the total estimated deterrence effects
of the DOJ criminal enforcement program. Using 2010 dollars, the low
estimates would decrease the $7.737 billion DOJ deterrence estimate to
$5.571 billion. The high estimates would increase the DOJ deterrence
estimate to $8.689 billion.87 These are still much lower than the recovery
totals in (and resulting deterrence from) the private cases.88
Alternatively, one could ask how much one year in prison and one
year of house arrest have to be disvalued on average for the deterrence
effects of the Antitrust Division’s entire criminal anti-cartel program
from 1990 to 2007 to equal the deterrence value of the forty large private
cases from the same period (and, of course, also considering the
corporate fines, individual fines, and restitution that the DOJ secured).
Only if the deterrence effects of prison time was $43–48 million per year
on average (i.e., slightly more than $3.5 to $4.0 million per month), and
the deterrence effects of house arrest was $21.5–24 million per year on
average, would the entire DOJ anti-cartel program produce as much
deterrence as these forty cases.89

86. Even the $3 million estimate for the disutility associated with one year in prison is as
large as some of the estimates of the value of a life according to some of the studies cited earlier. See
supra notes 27–29. The $12 million estimate would be at the upper end of the range of estimates of
the value of a human life calculated by these studies. See supra notes 27–29. (From a philosophical
perspective, is one year of the life of a price fixer really “worth” the same as an average human life?)
87. If we were to use the $12 million figure for the value of one year in prison and $6
million for one year of house arrest, the deterrence value of all the DOJ anti-cartel programs since
1990 would rise significantly. Using 2010 dollars, the total DOJ deterrence figure would rise from
$7.731 billion to $8.136 billion, more than the amounts that defendants paid in the thirteen private
cases that also had a criminal penalty, but less than the deterrence value of the twenty-five per se
cases in the sample, and less than half of the more than $21billion paid in all 40 cases in the sample.
See infra Tables 9 & 10.
88. Even these larger nominal figures yield results that are less than the nominal $9.2 to
$10.6 billion secured by the twenty-five private per se cases, or the nominal $10.34 to $11.973
billion paid in the twenty-four cases that also resulted in government relief, much less the nominal
$18 billion or more from all forty cases.
89. 330.24 years in prison disvalued at $43–48million per year plus 96.85 years of house
arrest disvalued at $21.5–24 million per year, plus the $5.466 billion total for corporate, individual
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IV. WERE THE PRIVATE CASES MERITORIOUS?
If the criticisms of private antitrust enforcement noted earlier are
correct and private actions often obtain results in cases that lack merit,
not only might they fail to discourage anticompetitive behavior, they
might discourage legal—and beneficial—conduct. In other words, they
might have the opposite of a beneficial deterrence effect! For several
reasons, however, this concern is likely misplaced, at least with respect
to most of the forty cases we studied.
First, even though almost all of the forty cases were only settlements,
it should be recalled that a federal judge approved these settlements.
While this certainly is not the same as a verdict, a diverse and generally
conservative group of federal judges did ratify that the settlements were
fair to members of the plaintiff classes. We note that of the forty-five
federal judges who approved the settlements or otherwise presided over
part or all of the cases we studied, twenty-seven were appointed by a
Republican president.90 We also note that these judges approved these
cases during an era where every Supreme Court antitrust decision has
been decided in favor of the defendant. Each of the last fifteen antitrust
decisions, made by a court rated by Judge Posner as the most
conservative since 1930,91 including every case decided after 1992
through 2009, went against plaintiffs.92 Given that this tide of prodefendant instruction effectively tells the lower courts how to decide
fines and restitution, equals $21.7 to $23.6 billion. This is roughly the same as the private totals of
$21.9–$23.9 billion. All figures are calculated using 2010 dollars
90. See infra Table 11.
91. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical
Study, 6–7, 18, 46 tbl.3 (Univ. Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 404, 2009), 1 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 775 (2009) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id=1126403.
92. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109 (2009) (9–0 in the
judgment, 5–4 in regard to the Court’s opinion); Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,
127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007) (5–4 decision); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co.,
127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007) (9–0); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) (7–2); Credit
Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007) (7–1); Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v.
Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164 (2006) (7–2); Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006) (8–
0); Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (8–0); Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v.
Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) (9–0); U.S. Postal Serv. v. Flamingo
Indus. (USA) Ltd., 540 U.S. 736 (2004) (9–0); F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542
U.S. 155 (2004) (8–0); California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1998); Nynex Corp. v.
Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); Brown v. Pro Football,
Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996); see Andrew I. Gavil, Antitrust Book Ends: The 2006 Supreme Court Term
in Historical Context, 22 ANTITRUST 21, 22 (2007) (“The last clear plaintiffs’ victories in the Court
occurred in 1992 in two cases, [Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, 504 U.S. 451
(1992)] and [FTC v. Ticor Title Ins., 504 U.S. 621 (1992)].”).
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close cases, and given that the high percentage of judges presiding in the
litigation we studied were appointed by Republican presidents, one
would not expect that approval of the class action settlements would be
based on any pre-existing excessive sympathy for plaintiffs’ attorneys.93
Second, a large number of the opinions in the forty cases contain
generous and gratuitous praise for the plaintiffs’ counsel handling the
case.94 Of the eight judges from whom we were able to discover explicit
and generous praise for the conduct of plaintiffs’ attorneys (in none of
the cases did we discover criticism), five were appointed by a Republican
president.95 This too helps give assurance that the cases brought by
private counsel generally were in the public interest.
Third, an advantage of our selecting only cases that returned more
than $50 million in cash benefits to victims is that this screens out
nuisance settlements. We are very skeptical about claims that defending
these suits often costs innocent firms $10 million or more. We would
believe this only for very unusual cases. Regardless, $50 million should
be well above the nuisance value of an unmeritorious case. Moreover,
the majority of the cases we studied (23/40) settled for more than $100
million.96
Fourth, since actions that settle for more than $50 million are not
nuisance lawsuits, the recoveries almost surely reflect the defendants’
perception that they could well lose on the merits, not only at trial but
also on appeal. To be sure, some may assert that defendants settle
regardless of the merits of their cases simply because they are risk
averse. This may sometimes be true. Of course, the risk to which they are
averse is that they may lose. Moreover, plaintiffs—or, in contingency fee
cases, plaintiffs’ counsel—also tend to be averse to risk, probably more
so than defendants. Plaintiff’s lawyers often pay millions of dollars
toward the costs of litigation—both in terms of out of pocket expenses
and in terms of the implicit value of thousands of hours of their time—all

93. See infra Appendix I, Table 11. We do not mean to suggest that judges act on crass
political commitments in presiding over litigation or that party affiliation correlates perfectly with
attitudes toward plaintiffs in class actions. Our point is that our analysis is supported to the extent
party affiliation might serve as an extremely crude and rough check on whether the judges in the
cases we studied were unduly sympathetic to class counsel’s efforts.
94. For examples, see Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note *, at 903–04.
95. See id. at 903–04, 914 tbl.10.
96. It is difficult for a firm to believably claim, in effect: “We are saints who did absolutely
nothing wrong. Nevertheless, we paid $50 million or $100 million or more just to make the case go
away.” While we are not saying this can never happen, as the settlements get higher, this argument
loses credibility.
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of which will be uncompensated if the case proceeds to trial and
defendants prevail. This could give plaintiffs’ attorneys an incentive to
settle for amounts that are too low. Defendants’ attorneys, by contrast,
are paid by the hour, so they do not have the same kind of risk aversion
incentives. In sum, there is no basis for believing that defendants are
more risk averse than plaintiffs. If anything, we believe the reverse could
well be true.97 For these reasons, settlement values are at least as likely
to be too low as they are to be too high.98
A final reason to believe that the cases we studied were generally
meritorious is that most were validated in whole or in part by means
other than settlement in private litigation. This validation took various
forms:
1. In thirteen of the forty cases (32.5%), defendants or their
employees were subject to criminal penalties, generally through guilty
pleas.
2. In twelve of the forty cases (30%), government enforcers obtained
a civil recovery, usually in the form of a consent order.
3. In nine of the forty cases (22.5%), plaintiffs survived or prevailed
on a motion for summary judgment (or partial summary judgment).
4. In nine of the forty cases (22.5%), defendants lost at trial in the
private litigation or in a closely related case.
5. In at least three out of forty cases (7.5%) plaintiffs survived a
motion to dismiss.99
In sum, thirty-four of the forty cases (85%) had at least one of these
indicators that plaintiffs’ case was meritorious. (This total would be
97. It could be argued that plaintiffs’ attorneys sometimes have an incentive to “sell out their
clients” by settling for too low an amount, too quickly—that their incentive is just to take less money
than the victims deserve and then to move on to the next case. Moreover, in class action cases,
plaintiffs have difficulty effectively policing their counsel so the possibility of settlements that are
too quick and too low is a serious one. By contrast, it could be argued that defense lawyers have the
incentive to delay and reject reasonable offers and thereby bill as many hours as possible, even if
defendants’ clients are in a better position to oversee their attorneys’ activities than plaintiffs. For a
further discussion of these issues, see Joshua P. Davis and Eric L. Cramer, Of Vulnerable
Monopolists?: Questionable Innovation in the Standard for Class Certification in Antitrust Cases,
41 RUTGERS L.J. 355 (2009); Joshua P. Davis and Eric L. Cramer, Antitrust, Class Certification, and
the Politics of Procedure, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 969 (2010).
98. Others may also say that defendants worry that they will lose when they should not. This
raises a philosophical issue. If the courts say conduct violates the antitrust laws, and if an appellate
court, perhaps even the Supreme Court, confirms liability, is it meaningful to say that the outcome is
wrong? For practical purposes, we adopt a positivist’s view and suggest that the law is whatever the
ultimate court declares it to be. Any other perspective would make a study like ours infeasible.
99. In fact, the percentage of cases in which plaintiffs survived a motion to dismiss may be
higher. We did not consistently note this aspect of the litigation we studied.
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thirty-three if motions to dismiss are not included. The percentages
appear to total more than 100% because eight of the forty cases involved
more than one basis for validation.) Table 12, infra, summarizes this
information. Table 13, infra, lists the cases in which the merits received
each kind of validation.
Table 12: Summary of Kinds of Validation in Cases
Kind of Validation of Merits

Number of Cases

Criminal Penalty

13 out of 40 (32.5%)

Government Obtained Civil Relief

12 out of 40 (30%)

Ds Lost Trial in Same or Related
Case

9 out of 40 (22.5%)

Ps Survived or Prevailed at
Summary Judgment

9 out of 40 (22.5%)

Ps Survived Motion to Dismiss

3 out 40 (7.5%)

At Least One Basis for Validation

34 out of 40 (85%)

At Least One Basis for Validation,
Not Including Surviving Motion to
Dismiss

33 out of 40 (82.5%)

Ultimately, there is no way to prove or fully refute assertions that
many or most private cases are unmeritorious and are tantamount to
extortion. But the above analysis offers reasons to conclude that all of the
cases we studied involved legitimate claims, and there is no reason to
believe otherwise, beyond defendants’ self-serving assertions.
V. QUALIFICATIONS AND CAVEATS
Throughout this article, we have explicitly or implicitly added a large
number of qualifications and caveats to our analysis. Some of the most
important are worth recapitulating briefly so the conclusions presented in
the next section can be assessed fairly.
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Concerning DOJ enforcement, corporate criminal fines and all
restitution and payments in private cases are made by the corporations
involved. Prison terms and house arrests (which are virtually impossible
to value accurately) are served by the individuals involved, and the
individual fines are often paid by the individuals involved.100 We are
adding the deterrence effects of all these together to arrive at a measure
of total deterrence. We are implicitly assuming that the corporations
involved are profit-maximizing and that the executives involved care
what happens to their employers. We recognize there are agent/principal
problems and behavioral economics issues as well. As noted above, some
executives may care only or primarily about the sanctions directed
against them as individuals; some may care equally what happens to their
employer (either out of professional pride, corporate loyalty, or because
of how a corporate sanction could affect their career); other executives
might care about both, but weigh the individual sanctions more heavily.
To these agent/principal problems, we have arbitrarily tripled the
deterrence effects of the individual sanctions (prison, house arrest, and
fines) compared to the corporate payouts (fines, restitution, and payouts
in private cases).
Concerning private enforcement, the $18–19.6 billion in payments
made in forty large private antitrust cases is only an extremely low floor
on the total deterrence effects of private antitrust enforcement, for many
reasons. While these were among the largest private antitrust cases
brought during the relevant time period, surely the total paid by
defendants in the thousands of private antitrust cases that ended during
this period was many times as large. This total also omitted the
deterrence value of the products, discounts, services, and coupons that
were part of the relief in these cases.
Concerning the DOJ/private comparison, the comparison of the
relative deterrence from private and DOJ cases did not attempt to value
the injunctive relief or legal precedent obtained in either type of case.
The deterrence effects of defendants’ attorneys’ fees and the stress and
time involved for defendants in defending both the DOJ and the private
cases has also been omitted. These are significant omissions. This
Article’s analysis assumes the effects of these omitted factors would be

100. For a discussion on whether the antitrust fines imposed on corporate employees are
ultimately paid by the employees, or whether they are often or usually directly or indirectly paid by
their employer, see Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note *.
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the same for both private enforcement and DOJ enforcement, but we
know of no way to ascertain whether this is true.101
Further, reasonable people could dispute who first discovered some
of the violations that gave rise to the sample of forty large private cases.
The Lande/Davis study concluded, on the basis of admittedly imperfect
public information and interviews with attorneys, that sixteen of these
forty cases originally had been discovered by private parties and their
counsel, ten were follow-ons to government enforcement actions, and the
others had mixed or uncertain origins. This figure for follow-on cases of
10/40, or 25%, is consistent with a survey by Kauper & Snyder, which
found that only 20% of private cases were follow-on cases.102 Moreover,
at least nine of the private follow-on cases (9/40 or 22.5%) were
significantly broader than the DOJ case: they involved more defendants
than the DOJ case, more causes of action, greater relief (in some
instances the only relief), or longer periods of illegality.103
If, contrary to our findings, every one of the forty private antitrust
violations had originally been uncovered by the DOJ (even private
actions where the DOJ never filed a case), this fact would complicate an
analysis of the relative deterrence effects of private and public antitrust
enforcement. The DOJ certainly should get partial credit for the private
recoveries obtained in any cases it uncovered or helped to uncover, even
if the private parties secured the bulk of the sanctions.104 Nevertheless, it
101. The only indication of the relative value of the precedents that were established comes
from the Calkins study, which concluded that the most important precedents in recent years were
established through private litigation. Calkins, supra note 11.
102. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 681 n.36 (1986) (“Although the conventional wisdom has long been that class
actions tend to ‘tag along’ on the heels of governmentally initiated suits, a recent study of antitrust
litigation by Professors Kauper and Snyder has placed this figure at ‘[l]ess than 20% of private
antitrust actions filed between 1976 and 1983.’” (quoting Moore, Data Galore in Georgetown
Damage Study, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 4, 1985, at 24, col.4)).
103. See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note *, at 910 tbl.6.
104. Each type of plaintiff might make a different contribution to the deterrence mix. As we
noted in Global Competition Litigation Review:
In fact, there are many reasons to believe that, as a practical matter the government
cannot be expected to do all or even most of the necessary enforcing for various reasons
including: budgetary constraints; undue fear of losing cases; lack of awareness of
industry conditions; overly suspicious views about complaints by ‘losers’ that they were
in fact victims of anticompetitive behavior; higher turnover among government attorneys;
and the unfortunate reality that government enforcement (or non-enforcement) decisions
are at times politically motivated. Not surprisingly, a vigorous private antitrust or
competition regime is likely to confer significant benefits over and above those conferred
by a system reliant solely upon government enforcement.

345

DO NOT DELETE

1/31/2013 3:27 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2011

would not be fair to give the DOJ complete credit for any resulting
deterrence, because if there had been no private enforcement, this
deterrence never would have arisen. Rather, the fairest thing would be to
share credit for this deterrence between the public and private enforcers.
Another general caveat concerns how, from a deterrence perspective,
perceptions can be more important than the realities this article has
attempted to document. For example, Professor Stephen Calkins, who is
from Detroit, noted the extraordinary prominence in Michigan of Alfred
Taubman. Calkins said that the extensive press coverage of Mr.
Taubman’s being sent to (and later released from) prison for an antitrust
offense sent a message to business leaders that no imaginable fine could
equal.105 In this regard, some of the stereotypes about private enforcers
also could help to deter antitrust violations. Irwin Stelzer articulated the
widely held belief: “An army of private enforcers, enlisting help from
attorney-entrepreneurs free to accept cases on a contingency fee basis,
freed of ‘loser pays’ obligations, is an important supplement to those
limited [government] resources.”106 Although defendants to a large
extent have succeeded in portraying plaintiffs’ attorneys as the modern
economy’s bogeymen, their fears of this swarming private “army” might
do a great deal to discourage anticompetitive conduct, despite the fact
that many recent court decisions have weakened private enforcement
substantially.107
Finally, this Article is not attempting to perform a cost/benefit
analysis of private antitrust enforcement. Many others have asserted
problems with private enforcement (although without any systematic
evidence), and we readily agree that some private cases have not been in
the public interest. Nevertheless, we believe the debate over private
antitrust enforcement deserves balance.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Our primary conclusion is that the benefits of private antitrust
enforcement are substantial and underappreciated. The importance of

Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Of Myths and Evidence: An Analysis of 40 U.S. Cases for
Countries Considering a Private Right of Action for Competition Law Violations, 2 GLOBAL
COMPETITION LITIG. REV. 126, 18–19 (2009).
105. Stephen Calkins, Remarks at the George Washington University Law School Antitrust
Conference (Feb. 27, 2009).
106. Irwin Stelzer, Implications for Productivity Growth in the Economy, Address at the
Office of Fair Trading’s Workshop on Private Enforcement of Competition Law (Oct. 19, 2006).
107. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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private enforcement to compensation perhaps requires little elaboration
because there is no meaningful alternative means for victims of
anticompetitive behavior to recover for the harm they suffered as a result
of antitrust violations. Perhaps more surprisingly, there is evidence that
private antitrust enforcement does more than DOJ criminal enforcement
to deter anticompetitive behavior.
It is, of course, extremely difficult to isolate successes in the antitrust
world. Even if a particular private case succeeded in forcing violators to
surrender $100 million or more to their victims, it often would be
reasonable to credit many parties in addition to the victims and their
counsel. A case could rely in whole or in part on a conspiracy uncovered
or partly uncovered by an earlier DOJ investigation, as well as on a legal
precedent established by a State Attorney General in an unrelated case;
and the case itself could have been financed by private counsel who was
able to do so only because of success in a prior private litigation. As
always, success has many parents. Rather than enter into fruitless
arguments about which type of enforcement is entitled to what
percentage of the credit, and, regardless of whether it is viewed from a
deterrence or compensation perspective, perhaps the safest conclusion is
that private enforcement is an important complement to government
enforcement.
Moreover, the cost to the taxpayer of the deterrence and
compensation that arises from private enforcement is practically
nonexistent. The only cost to the taxpayer is the cost of maintaining
some portion of the judicial system. This amounts to only a tiny fraction
of the benefits of private enforcement and would be incurred even if all
these cases were brought by government enforcers.
In addition, the high success rate of government litigation suggests
that in the absence of private litigation, many bad actors would get away
with violating the antitrust laws. In most cases, if the law is somewhat
unclear, or if the evidence of illegal conduct is not absolutely compelling
at the outset of a legal action, the DOJ does not seem to be willing to
pursue litigation. This may well be the appropriate approach for the
government to take. But it holds the potential for antitrust laws to go
largely unenforced.
Within this context, private litigation of the antitrust laws seems to
play a crucial role. In the United States, the anticompetitive conduct that
gives rise to government enforcement currently occurs far too frequently,
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even factoring in the effects of the present system of private litigation.108
A fortiori, this conduct would be even more underdeterred if the United
States’ eliminated or substantially curtailed private enforcement. We
would be surprised if firms in other nations were significantly more law
abiding than U.S. firms, and we suspect that the United States’ record of
underdeterrence of anticompetitive conduct (and undercompensation of
victims) exists in many if not most other nations as well. Although each
nation has unique needs, history, institutions, capabilities, and
circumstances, and we would never advocate a “one-size-fits-all”
approach to competition legislation, we do urge every nation without
private enforcement of its competition laws to seriously consider
permitting victim suits.109

APPENDIX I: TABLES
Table 1: Total Corporate Antitrust Fines 1990–2007110

Year (Fiscal)

Total Corporate Fines ($000)

1990

22,658

1991

17,573

1992

22,430

1993

40,427

1994

38,996

1995

40,222

1996

25,245

108. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
109. Europeans often believe that public enforcement should be concerned with deterrence
while private enforcement should be concerned with compensation of victims. See Wouter P.J. Wils,
The Relationship Between Public Antitrust Enforcement and Private Actions for Damages, 32
WORLD COMPETITION 3, passim (2009). We believe that the deterrence effects of private
enforcement should be given greater consideration.
110. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 1990–1999 12,
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/246419.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2011); U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 12.
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1997

203,931

1998

241,645

1999

959,866

2000

303,241

2001

270,778

2002

93,826

2003

63,752

2004

140,586

2005

595,966

2006

469,805

2007

615,671

Total

4,166,618

Table 2: Total Individual Antitrust Fines 1990–2007111

Year (Fiscal)

Total Individual Fines ($000)

1990

917

1991

2,806

1992

1,275

1993

1,868

1994

1,240

1995

1,211

1996

1,572

1997

1,247

1998

2,499

111. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 110 at 12; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 10, at
12.
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1999

12,273

2000

5,180

2001

2,019

2002

8,685

2003

470

2004

644

2005

4,483

2006

3,650

2007

15,109

Total

67,148

Table 3: Total Restitution 1990–2007112

Year

Restitution Imposed in Connection
with Criminal Antitrust Cases ($000)

1990

5,670

1991

3,185

1992

3,550

1993

950

1994

4,220

1995

1,200

1996

799

1997

275

1998

4,250

1999

2,343

2000

1,713

112. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 110, at 12; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 10, at
12.
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2001

31,083

2002

7,278

2003

15,545

2004

18,776

2005

10,371

2006

2,165

2007

4,790

Total

118,163

Table 4: Total Incarceration 1990–2007113

Year

Incarceration: Number of Days of
Prison Time Sentenced in Antitrust
Division Cases

1990

2,739

1991

6,594

1992

2,488

1993

4,726

1994

1,497

1995

3,902

1996

2,431

1997

789

1998

1,301

1999

6,662

2000

5,584

113. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 110, at 13; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 10, at
13.
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2001

4,800

2002

10,501

2003

9,341

2004

7,334

2005

13,157

2006

5,383

2007

31,391

Total

120,620
120,620 ÷ 365.25 = 330.24 years

Table 5: Total of Non-Prison Confinement Days (e.g., House Arrest)
1990–2007114

Year

Number of Other Confinement Days
Sentenced in Antitrust Division Cases

1990

632

1991

1,519

1992

1,734

1993

3,552

1994

2,475

1995

2,933

1996

1,148

1997

1,270

1998

1,530

1999

2,850

2000

2,567

114. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 110, at 13; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 10, at
13.
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2001

1,844

2002

3,607

2003

1,025

2004

1,575

2005

1,270

2006

2,760

2007

1,085

Total

35,376
35,376 ÷ 365.25 = 96.85 years

Table 6: The 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund115

Level of Income

Average Award

Number of
Claimants

Total Awards

0

$788,022.03

17

$13,396,374.59

$24,999 or less

$1,102,135.44

163

$179,648,077.33

$25,000 – $99,999

$1,520,155.41

1,591

$2,418,567,253.96

$100,000 –
$199,999

$2,302,234.80

633

$1,457,314,626.24

$200,000 –
$499,999

$3,394,624.91

310

$1,052,333,721.38

$500,000 –
$999,999

$4,749,654.40

89

$422,719,241.32

115. See FEINBERG REPORT, supra note 48, at 97 tbl.2. The Fund’s report provided the total
amount of compensation for a given income bracket and the total number of claims at that income
level. The average awards were arrived at by dividing the total awards by the number of claimants at
that income level. Id.
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Level of Income

Average Award

Number of
Claimants

Total Awards

$1,000,000 –
$1,999,999

$5,671,815.64

52

$294,934,413.48

$2,000,000 –
$3,999,999

$6,253,705.42

17

$106,312,992.16

$4,000,000+

$6,379,287.70

8

$51,034,301.62

Table 7: Recoveries in Private Cases116

Case

Recovery ($ millions)

Airline Ticket Commission Litigation

86

Auction Houses

452 (plus 100 in uncounted fully
redeemable coupons)

Augmentin

91

Automotive Refinishing Paint

106

Buspirone

220

Caldera

275

Cardizem (direct class)

110

Citric Acid

175

Commercial Explosives

77

Conwood

1,050

DRAM

326

116. Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note *, at 879, 892 tbl.1 (2008). For summaries of the
individual case studies analyzed in this article, see Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Benefits
from Antitrust Private Antitrust Enforcement: Forty Individual Case Studies, SSRN,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1105523 (last modified Mar. 1, 2008)
[hereinafter Individual Case Studies].
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Drill Bits

53

El Paso

1,427 (plus 125 in uncounted rate
reductions)

Flat Glass

122

Fructose

531

Graphite Electrodes

47

IBM

775 (plus 75 in uncounted credit
towards Microsoft software)

Insurance

36

Lease Oil

193

Linerboard

202

Lysine

65

Microcrystalline Cellulose

50

NASDAQ

1,027

NCAA

74

Netscape

750

Paxil

165

Platinol

50

Polypropylene Carpet

50

RealNetworks

478 to 761

Relafen

250

Remeron

75

Rubber Chemicals

268

Sorbates

96

Specialty Steel

50

Sun

700

Taxol

66

Terazosin

74

Urethane

73

Visa/MasterCard

3,383
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Vitamins

3,908 to 5,258

Total

18,006 to 19,639
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Table 8: Recoveries in Cases Validated by Government Action

Case

Validation of Merits in
Government Action

Recovery ($ millions)

Auction Houses

Criminal Penalty

452

Buspirone

Part of Course of Conduct
Resulting in FTC Consent
Order

220

Cardizem

Conduct Resulted in FTC
Consent Order

110

Citric Acid

Criminal Penalty

175

Commercial Explosives

Criminal Penalty

77

DRAM

Criminal Penalty

326

Drill Bits

Criminal Penalty

53

El Paso

FERC Ruling Against D

1,427

Graphite Electrodes

Criminal Penalty

47

IBM

Government Prevailed at
Trial in Related Case

775

Lysine

Criminal Penalty

65

Microcrystalline
Cellulose

FTC Consent Orders

50

Netscape v. Microsoft

Government Prevailed at
Trial in Related Case

750

Platinol

Part of Course of Conduct
Resulting in FTC Consent
Order

50
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Polypropylene Carpet

Criminal Penalty

50

EU Preliminary Findings
Against D in Related Case
and U.S. Government
Prevailed at Trial in
Somewhat Related Case

478 to 761

Criminal Penalty

268

Criminal Penalty

96

Criminal Penalty

50

Sun v. Microsoft

Government Prevailed at
Trial in Related Case

700

Taxol

Part of Course of Conduct
Resulting in FTC Consent
Order

66

Terazosin

Government Obtained
Injunctive Relief

74

Urethane

Criminal Penalty

73

Vitamins

Criminal Penalty

3,908 to 5,258

RealNetworks v.
Microsoft

Rubber Chemicals
Sorbates
Specialty Steel

Total

358
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Table 9: Recoveries in Per Se Cases117

Case

Recovery ($ millions)

Airline Ticket Commission Litigation

86

Auction Houses

452 (plus 100 in uncounted fully
redeemable coupons)

Automotive Refinishing Paint

106

Cardizem (direct class)

110

Citric Acid

175

Commercial Explosives

77

Conwood

1,050

DRAM

326

Drill Bits

53

Flat Glass

122

Fructose

531

Graphite Electrodes

47

Insurance

36

Lease Oil

193

Linerboard

202

Lysine

65

Microcrystalline Cellulose

50

NASDAQ

1,027

Polypropylene Carpet

50

Rubber Chemicals

268

Sorbates

96

Specialty Steel

50

Terazosin

74

Urethane

73

117. Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note *, at 913 tbl.9.
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Vitamins

3,908 to 5,258

Total

9,227 to 10,577

Table 10: Recoveries for Cases with a Criminal Penalty as Well118

Case

Recovery ($ millions)

Auction Houses

452 (plus 100 in uncounted fully
redeemable coupons)

Citric Acid

175

Commercial Explosives

77

DRAM

326

Drill Bits

53

Graphite Electrodes

47

Lysine

65

Polypropylene Carpet

50

Rubber Chemicals

268

Sorbates

96

Specialty Steel

50

Urethane

73

Vitamins

3,908 to 5,258

Total

6,171 to 7,521

Table 11: Judges Presiding Over Private Litigation by Case and
Appointing President119
Judge

Case

Nominated By

Political Party

118. Id. at 914 tbl.11.
119. See Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf (follow “Judges of the United States Courts” hyperlink, then
search for judges by name) (last visited Feb. 25, 2011).
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James Rosenbaum
Lewis A. Kaplan
Henry Coke
Morgan
Terrell Hodges

Airline Tickets
Commission
Auction House
Augmentin
Automotive
Refinishing

John F. Keenan

Ronald
Reagan
Bill Clinton
George H. W.
Bush
Richard Nixon
Ronald
Reagan

Republican
Democrat
Republican
Republican

Republican

Morey L. Sear
Gerald Ford
Republican
Bruce M. Selya

Ronald
Reagan

Julia Smith
Gibbons

Republican
Ronald
Reagan

D. Lowell Jensen

Republican
Ronald
Reagan

J. Frederick Motz

Republican
Ronald
Reagan
Republican
Democrat

John G. Koeltl

Buspirone

Dee Benson

Caldera

Nancy G.
Edmunds

Cardizem

Fern M. Smith

Citric Acid

David Sam

Commercial
Explosives

Bill Clinton
George H.W.
Bush
George H.W.
Bush
Ronald
Reagan
Ronald
Reagan

Conwood

Bill Clinton

Democrat

DRAM

Bill Clinton
Lyndon B.
Johnson

Democrat

N/A

N/A

Thomas B.
Russell
Phyllis Hamilton
John V. Singleton

Drill Bits

Richard Haden
(San Diego Sup.

El Paso

Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican

Democrat
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Court)
Donald Emil
Ziegler / Donettta
W. Ambrose

Flat Glass

Michael M. Mihm

Fructose

Charles R. Weiner

Graphite
Electrodes

Colleen KollarKetelly
Willian W.
Schwarzer

IBM
Insurance

Jan E. Dubois

Linerboard

Milton I. Shadur
Thomas Newman
O’Neill, Jr.

Lysine
Microcrystalline
Cellulose

Kathryn H. Vratil

NCAA

Thomas Penfield
Jackson
Janis Graham Jack

Netscape v.
Microsoft
Oil Lease

John Padova

Paxil

Emmit G. Sullivan

Platinol
Polypropylene
Carpet
RealNetwoks v.
Microsoft

Harold Murphy
Frederick Motz
Reginald C.
Lindsay
Faith Hochberg
Terrell Hodges
Maxine M.
Chesney
Norman W. Black

Ronald
Reagan
Lyndon B.
Johnson
Ronald
Reagan
Gerald Ford
Ronald
Reagan
Jimmy Carter
Ronald
Reagan
George H.W.
Bush
Ronald
Reagan
Bill Clinton
George H.W.
Bush
Bill Clinton

Democrat /
Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Democrat

Jimmy Carter

Democrat

Ronald
Reagan

Republican

Relafen

Bill Clinton

Democrat

Remeron
Rubber Chemicals

Bill Clinton
Richard Nixon

Democrat
Republican

Sorbates

Bill Clinton

Democrat

Specialty Steel

Jimmy Carter
Ronald
Reagan
Ronald

Democrat

Frederick Motz

Sun v. Microsoft

Emmet G.

Taxol
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Jimmy Carter /
Bill Clinton

2011

Republican
Republican
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Terazosin
Urethane
Visa/MasterCard
Vitamins

Reagan
Bill Clinton
George H.W.
Bush
Bill Clinton
Ronald
Reagan

Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Total
Republicans: 27
Total Democrats:
18
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Table 13: Summary of Validation of Merits in Individual Cases120

Case

Validation of Merits

Airline Tickets Commission

None Reported

Auction Houses

Criminal Penalty

Augmentin

Rulings against Ds on Underlying
Patent Issues in Related Cases

Automotive Refinishing

None Reported

Buspirone

Part of Course of Conduct Resulting in
FTC Consent Order

Caldera

Survive SJ

Cardizem

Partial SJ for Ps on Per Se Issue (Aff’d
on Appeal) and Conduct Resulted in
FTC Consent Order

Citric Acid

Criminal Penalty

Commercial Explosives

Jury Verdict Against Ds by
competitor, Criminal Penalty

Conwood

Jury Verdict Against D (Aff’d on
Appeal)

DRAM

Survived SJ and Criminal Penalty

Drill Bits

Criminal Penalty

El Paso

FERC Ruling Against D

120. See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note *.
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Flat Glass

SJ Against Ps Overruled on Appeal

Fructose

SJ Against Ps Overruled on Appeal

Graphite Electrodes

Criminal Penalty

IBM

Government Prevailed at Trial in
Related Case

Insurance

Dismissal Reversed in Appellate Court
(Aff’d by USSC)

Linerboard

None Reported (Other than Class
Certification)

Lysine

Criminal Penalty

Microcrystalline Cellulose

FTC Consent Orders

NCAA

SJ for Ps on Liability (Aff’d on
Appeal)

Netscape v. Microsoft

Government Prevailed at Trial in
Related Case

Oil Lease

None Reported

Paxil

None Reported

Platinol

Part of Course of Conduct Resulting in
FTC Consent Order

Polypropylene Carpet

Criminal Penalty

RealNetworks v. Microsoft

EU Preliminary Findings Against D in
Related Case and U.S. Government
Prevailed at Trial in Somewhat
Related Case
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Ruling against D on Underlying Patent
Issues in Related Case (Aff’d on
Appeal) and Ps Survive Motion to
Dismiss and for SJ and Prevail on
Motion of Issue Preclusion Regarding
Patent Validity

Remeron

None Reported

Rubber Chemicals

Criminal Penalty

Sorbates

Criminal Penalty

Specialty Steel

Criminal Penalty and Ps Survived
Motions to Dismiss

Sun v. Microsoft

Government Prevailed at Trial in
Related Case

Taxol

Part of Course of Conduct Resulting in
FTC Consent Order

Terazosin

Partial SJ for Ps on Per Se Issue and
Government Obtained Injunctive
Relief

Urethane

Criminal Penalty

Visa/MasterCard

Ps Prevailed on SJ and Defeated SJ

Vitamins

Criminal Penalty and Jury Verdict
Against Non-Settling D
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Table 14: Present Value (in 2010 dollars) of the Recoveries in the Forty
Private Cases121

#

1

2

3

Case Name
In re Airline Ticket
Commission
Litigation, 1996 U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS 20361 (D.
Minn. Aug 12, 1996);
1996-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) P71,552
In re Auction Houses
Antitrust Litigation,
164 F. Supp. 2d 345
(S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d,
2002 U.S. App. LEXIS
15327 (2d Cir. 2002)
and Kruman v.
Christie’s International
PLC, 284 F.3d 384
(2d Cir. 2002)
Ryan-House et al. v.
GlaxoSmithKline PLC,
C.A.
Doc. No. 2:02cv442
(E.D.Va. 2004); SAJ
Distributors, Inc. and
Stephen L. LaFrance
Holdings, Inc. v.
SmithKline Beecham
Corp., Doc. No.
2:04cv23 (E.D. Pa

Year/Page
Found

Settlement
Amount
(Before
CPI/PPI)

2010
Dollars
(CPI)

1997/pg. 9

$86.1 Million

$117.0
Million

$412 Million
Domestic
(Cash)
Class
(Domestic)
(2000)/pg. 15
Foreign Class
$40
Million
(2003)/pg. 16
(Cash)
(Foreign)

Direct Class
(2004)/pg. 22
Indirect Class
(2004)/pg. 23

$62.5 Million
(Direct)
$29
Million
(Indirect)

(Dom)
$521.7
Million
(For.)
$47.4
Million

(Direct)
$72.2
Million
(Indir.)
$33
Million

121. All data taken from Individual Case Studies, supra note 116. Present values calculated
using CPI Inflation Calculator. CPI INFLATION CALCULATOR, supra note 69.
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filed Nov. 30, 2004)

4

5

6

7

8

9

368

In re Automotive
Refinishing Paint
Antitrust Litigation,
177 F. Supp. 2d 1378
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 15,
2001)
In re Buspirone
Antitrust Litigation,
185 F. Supp. 2d 340
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) MDL
Doc. No. 1413, and In
re Buspirone Patent
Litigation, 185 F.
Supp.2d 363 (S.D.N.Y.
2002). Final Settlement
approval at 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 26538,
(S.D.N.Y April 17,
2003). (BuSpar)
Caldera, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., Case
No. 2:96CV645B, 72
F.Supp.2d 1295 (D.
Utah 1999)
In re Cardizem CD
Antitrust Litigation,
MDL Docket No.
1278; 105 F.Supp 2d
682 (E.D. Mich. 2000);
332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir.
2003)
In re Citric Acid
Antitrust Litigation,
MDL Docket No.
1092; 996 F. Supp. 951
(N.D. Cal. 1998)
In re Commercial

(settlements
went on for a
period of 5–6
years;
however the
last settlement
was 2007)
2007/pg. 30

$105.75
Million

$111.24
Million

2003/pg. 38

$220 Million

$260.7
Million

2000/pg. 43

$275 Million

$348.2
Million

2004/pg. 54

$110 Million

$127.0
Million

1997/pg. 58
1998/pg. 58

$86.2 Million
$89 Million

$234.1
Million

1998/pg. 61

$113 Million

$151.2
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Explosives Litigation,
945 F. Supp. 1489 (D.
Utah 1996)

10

11

12

Conwood Co. v.
United States Tobacco
Co., 290 F.3d 768 (6th
Cir. 2002)
In re Dynamic
Random Access
Memory (DRAM)
Antitrust Litigation,
Master File No. M-021486PJH, MDL No.
1486, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 39841 (N.D.
Cal. June 5, 2006)
Natural Gas Antitrust
Cases I, II, III & IV.
Sweetie’s, et al. v. El
Paso Corp., No.
319840 (S.F. Super.
Ct. filed Mar. 20,
2001); Continental
Forge Company v.
Southern California
Gas Co., No.
BC237336 (L.A.
Super. Ct. Sept. 25,
2000); Berg v.
Southern California
Gas Co., No.
BC241951 (L.A.
Super. Ct. filed Dec.
18, 2000); City of
Long Beach v.
Southern California
Gas Co., No.
BC247114 (L.A.
Super. Ct. filed Mar.

Million

Trial 2000/pg.
70
Appeal/
Trebling
2002/ pg. 70

$1.05 Billion

$1.27
Billion

2007/pg. 75

$326 Million

$342.9
Million

2003/pg. 82

$551 Million
(cash + stock)
$876 Million
(semi-annual
cash)

$653.04
Million
$1.038
Billion
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13

14

15

20, 2001); City of L.A.
v. Southern California
Gas Co., No.
BC265905 (L.A.
Super. Ct. filed Mar.
20, 2001); Phillip v. El
Paso Merchant Energy
LP, No. GIC 759425
(San Diego Super. Ct.
filed Dec. 13, 2000);
and Phillip v. El Paso
Merchant Energy LP,
No. GIC 759426 (San
Diego Super. Ct. filed
Dec. 13, 2000). (El
Paso)
In re Flat Glass
Antitrust Litigation,
MDL 1200, Master
2005/pg. 93
Docket Misc. 97-0550,
191 F.R.D. 472 (W.D.
Pa. 1999)
In re Fructose Antitrust
Litigation, M.D.L. File
1087, Master File # 94- 2004/pg. 99
1577 (Michael Mihm)
(C.D. Ill. 1995)
In re Graphite
Electrodes Antitrust
Litigation, 2003 WL
2003/pg. 102
22358491 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 9, 2003)

16

IBM v. Microsoft

17

In re Insurance
Antitrust Litigation,
723 F. Supp. 464 (N.D.
1995/pg. 113
Cal. 19989); rev’d, 938
F. 2d 919 (9th Cir.
1991); aff’d sub nom

370

2005/pg. 107

2011

$121.7 Million

$136.0
Million

$531 Million

$613
Million

$47 Million

$55.7
Million

$775 Million
(cash)

$865.3
Million

$36 Million

$51.5
Million
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Hartford Ins. Co. v.
California, 509 U.S.
764 (1993)
In re Linerboard
Antitrust Litigation,
MDL No. 1261, 2000
WL 1475559, at *1–3
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2000)
(“Linerboard I” ); In re
Linerboard Antitrust
Litigation, 203 F.R.D.
197, 201–04 (E.D. Pa.
2001) (“Linerboard
II”); In re Linerboard
Antitrust Litigation,
305 F.3d 145, 147–49
(3d Cir. 2002)
(“Linerboard III”); In
re Linerboard Antitrust
Litigation, 321 F.Supp
2d 619 (E.D. Pa. 2004)

2004/pg. 116

$202.5 Million

19

In re Amino Acid
Lysine Antitrust
Litigation, MDL No.
1083, 918 F. Supp.
1190 (N.D. Ill. 1996).

1996/pg. 121
1997/pg 121
(federal class
and two
defendants)

$45 Million
(major
defendants)
$5 Million
(two
defendants)
$15 Million
(estimate for
state opt-out
plaintiffs)
$15 Million
(federal class
and opt-out
payments)

20

In re Microcrystalline
Cellulose Antitrust
Litigation, MDL No

2005/pg. 128
2003/pg. 129

$25 Million
$25 Million

$233.8
Million

$62.5
Million
(Major)
$6.8
Million
(Two)
$20.4
Million
(state optout)
$20.4
Million
(federal
class and
opt-out)
$27.9
Million
$29.6
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21

22

23

24

25

372

1402, 221 F.R.D. 428
(E.D. Pa. 2004)
In re NASDAQ
Market-Makers
Antitrust Litigation,
M.D.L. No, 1023, No.
94 Civ. 3996 (RWS)
(S.D.N.Y. 1998)
Law v. National
Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n., 902 F. Supp.
1394 (D.Kan. 1995);
aff’d, 134 F. 3d 1010
(10th Cir. 1998);
rev’d, 938 F.2d 919
(9th Cir. 1991)

2011
Million

1998/pg. 133

$1.027 Billion

$1.374
Billion

2000/pg. 139

$74.5 Million

$94.3
Million

$50 Million

$57.7
Million

$193.5 Million

$253.3
Million

$750 Million

$888.8
Million

North Shore
Hematology &
Oncology Associates
v. Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co., Civil
2004/pg. 140
Action
No.1:04cv248(EGS)
(D.D.C. filed Feb. 13,
2004) (Platinol)
In re Lease Oil
Antitrust Litigation
(No. II), 186 F.R.D.
1999/pg. 144
403 (S.D. Tex. 1999),
142 Oil & Gas Rep.
532 (1999)
Netscape Comm. Corp.
v. Microsoft Corp., Per
Local Civil Rule 40.5,
Related to Civil Action
2003/pg. 152
Nos. 98-1232 and 981233 (D.D.C.
2002)(a/k/a AOL v.
Microsoft)
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Oncology & Radiation
Associates v. BristolMeyers Squibb Co.,
Case No.
1:04CV00248 (D.D.C.)
(Taxol)
Stop N Shop
Supermarket
Company, et al. v.
Smithkline Beecham
Corp. Civil Action No.
03-CV-4578 (E.D. Pa.
filed Aug. 6, 2003),
and;
Nichols v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., No.
00-CV-6222 (E.D. Pa.
Jan 23, 2003) (Paxil)
In re Polypropylene
Carpet Antitrust
Litigation, 93 F. Supp.
2d 1348 (N.D. Ga.
2000)
RealNetworks, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., Civil
Action No. JFM-04968, MDL Docket No.
1332 (D. Md.) (2005
settlement)
Red Eagle Resources,
et al. v. Baker Hughes
Inc., et al.,
No.4:91cv00627
(Docket) (S.D. Tex.
Mar. 11, 1991) (In re
Drill Bits Antitrust
Litigation)
In re Relafen Antitrust
Litigation, Civil Action
No. 01-12239-WGY;

$65.8 Million

$78.0
Million

2005/pg. 163,
$165 Million
165

$184.2
Million

2001/pg. 171

$49.7 Million

$61.2
Million

2005/pg. 175

$478–$761
Million

$533.7–
$849.7
Million

1993/pg. 181
1994/pg. 181

$45.4 Million
$8 Million

$68.5
Million
$11.7
Million

2003/pg. 158

2004/pg. 188, $175 Million
Indirect 2005 (Direct)
pg. 190–91
$75
Million

$202.0
Million
$83.7
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32

33

34

35

36

374

346 F. Supp. 2d 349
(D. Mass. 2004); 231
F.R.D. 52 (D. Mass.
2005)
In re Remeron
Antitrust Litigation,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
27013 (D.N.J. Nov. 9,
2005)
In re Rubber
Chemicals Antitrust
Litigation, 350
F.Supp.2d 1366
(J.P.M.L. 2004), 20051 Trade Cases P
74,804 (J.P.M.L.2004)
(No. MDL 1648)
In re Sorbates Direct
Purchaser Antitrust
Litigation, 2002 WL
31655191 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 15, 2002)
Sun Microsystems v.
Microsoft, 333 F.3d
517 (4th Cir. 2003)
In re Terazosin
Hydrochloride
Antitrust Litigation
Case No.
99-MDL-1317Seitz/Klein, a/k/a
Louisiana Wholesale
Drug Co., Inc. v.
Abbot Laboratories, et
al. S.D. Fla. Case no.
98-3125, 352 F. Supp.
2d 1279 (S.D. Fla.
2005) and Valley Drug
Co. v. Abbot
Laboratories, et al.,

2005/pg. 194

2011
(Indirect)

Million

$75 Million

$83.7
Million

2005/pg. 202, $250.4 Million
Bayer
(Bayer)
2006/pg. 202, $18.5 Million
Flexsys
(Flexsys)

$279.6
Million
$20
Million

2002/pg. 207

$96.5 Million

$117
Million

2004/pg. 211

$700 Million

$808
Million

2002/pg. 213

$74.5 Million

$90.3
Million
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S.D. Fla.
Case No. 99-7143
Transamerican
Refining Corp. v.
Dravo Corp., et al., No.
4:88CV00789
(Docket) (S.D.Tex.
1992/pg. 221
Mar. 10, 1988)
(Specialty Steel
Piping Antitrust
Litigation) (1992
settlement)
In re Urethane
Antitrust Litigation,
MDL No. 1616, 232
2006/pg. 228
F.R.D. 681 (D. Kan.
2005)
In re Visa
Check/MasterMoney
Antitrust Litigation,
a/k/a Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. et. al v. Visa
2003/pg. 233
U.S.A. Inc. and
MasterCard
International Inc., 396
F.3d 96, 114 (2d Cir.
2005)
2003/pg. 242
(conservative
In re Vitamins
average of
Antitrust Litigation
settlement
(many related cases)
dates)
Total

In 2010
Dollars

$50 Million

$77.7
Million

$73.3 Million
(Chemical 1
$18M)
(Chemical 2
$55.3)

$79.3
Million

$3.383 Billion

$4.009
Billion

$4.2-$5.6
Billion

$4.977–
$6.636
Billion

$21.887–$23.862 Billion
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Table 15: Present Value (in 2010 dollars) of Sanctions Imposed from
1990–2007

1990
1991

Sanction122 Amounts
Before CPI ($000)
31,079
29,176

2010 Dollars
(CPI123)($000)
51,942
46,793

3
4
5
6
7
8

1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997

29,805
46,981
46,936
45,055
30,760
207,947

46,405
71,021
69,181
64,579
42,825
283,014

9
10
11
12
13
14

1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

253,392
999,028
320,494
307,918
127,159
80,707

339,575
1,309,884
406,553
379,793
154,400
95,813

15
16
17
18

2004
2005
2006
2007
Totals

161,244
619,786
482,920
665,788
4,486,175

186,458
693,218
523,257
701,421
5,466,132

#

Year

1
2

122. All data taken from Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Comparative Deterrence from
Private Enforcement and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1565693 (last revised September 9, 2010). These
figures represent the combined totals of corporate antitrust fines, individual antitrust fines, and
restitution from 1990-2007. The individual antitrust fines were tripled. For explanation, see
Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust
Laws, Section IV.
123. CPI INFLATION CALCULATOR, supra note 69.
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APPENDIX II: TABLE A AND ACCOMPANYING NOTES

Table A: Monetary Valuation of Prison Time Established Through False
Imprisonment Litigation.

Plaintiff

Sentence

Raul Ramirez 10 months

Total Award

Award per year

How
Finalized?

$9,000,000.00
(settlement)

$10,800,000.00

Phone
interview

George Jones

1 month

$355,500.00

$4,266,000.00

Phone
interview

Kerry Edwards

30 days

$327,500.00
(settlement)

$3,875,416.66

Phone
interview

Mark Diaz
Bravo

1,179 days

$3,758,976.90

$1,164,517.36

Phone
interview

James
Newsome

15 years

$15,000,000.00

$1,000,000.00

Phone
interview

Stephan
Cowans

6.5 years

$3,200,000.00
(settlement)

$492,307.69

Published
case

Ellen Maria
Reasonover

16 years

$7,500,000.00
(settlement)

$468,750.00

Published
case

Eddie Joe
Lloyd

17 years

$6,000,000.00
(settlement)

$352,941.17

Published
case

Neil Miller

10.5 years

$3,200,000.00
(settlement)

$304,761.91

Published
case

Larry Mayes

21 years

$214,285.72

Published
case

Eduardo
Velázquez

14 years

$175,000.00

Published
case

$4,500,000.00
(settlement)
$ 2,450,000.00
(settlement)
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Godschalk

2011

15 years

$2,340,000.00
(settlements)

$156,000.00

Published
case

7 years

$ 1,075,000.00
(settlement)

$153,571.43

Published
case

Olmedo
Hidalgo

14 years

$2,000,000.00
(settlement)

$142,857.15

Published
case

Kerry Kotler

10 years 8
months

$1510000.00

$141,563.39

Published
case

Robinson

14 years

$1,750,000.00
(settlement)

$125,000.00

Published
case

Michael Green 13 years

$16,00,000.00
(settlement)

$123,076.92

Published
case

$ 1,958,454.00
(settlement)

$100,433.54

Published
case

$400,000.00
(settlement)

$23,529.41

Published
case

Clarence
Elkins

Darryl Hunt

19.5 years

Stephen Avery 17 years

Notes for Table A—Following is a list of cases included in Table A.
This contains the researcher’s methodology notes and other general case
notes.
1. Raul Ramirez.124 The verdict in this case was $18 million dollars,
but it settled for $9 million.125 Ramirez was a twenty-five-year-old
special education teacher.126 Eight months after the attempted rape of a
sixteen-year-old girl, the police arrested Raul Ramirez, who spent ten
months incarcerated awaiting trial.127 He was found factually innocent
and sued for false arrest and malicious prosecution.128 This case was
cited in Limone v. United States as one of several cases in recent years
where courts have awarded compensation of more than $1,000,000.00
per year of wrongful incarceration.129

124. Telephone Interview with Mark Artan, attorney for Plaintiff Raul Ramirez (Oct. 28,
2009). This case settled in early 2006. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Ramirez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 397 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1215 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
127. See id. at 1212.
128. See id.
129. Limone v. United States, 497 F. Supp. 2d 143, 243–44 (D. Mass. 2007), aff’’d, 579 F.3d
79 (1st Cir. 2009).

378

DO NOT DELETE

315

1/31/2013 3:27 PM

Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement

2. George Jones.130 The defendant fully satisfied this judgment.131
We include only the false imprisonment portion of $355,500 and exclude
the $71,100 for false arrest, $71,100 for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, $213,300 for malicious prosecution, $90,000 in
punitive damages,132 and $271,188.75 in attorneys’ fees.133 The police
failed to turn over exculpatory evidence in a rape and murder case
against George Jones, who was a high school student at the time of
arrest.134 This case was found via a citation by the district court in
Limone.135
3. Kerry Edwards.136 The settlement is ambiguous as to the portion
of the award pertaining to false imprisonment and the portion of the
award pertaining to civil rights violations.137 Kerry Edwards was
misidentified as the subject of an arrest warrant and held for thirty
days.138 At Edwards’s insistence, an independent investigator wrote a
report within three days confirming that Edwards had been misidentified.
However, the report was ignored for several weeks while Edwards
continued to be incarcerated.139 This verdict summary was found by
running a Westlaw verdict search.140
4. Mark Diaz Bravo.141 This award was satisfied by the
defendant.142 The total award of $3,758,976 was calculated by taking the
$3,000.00 per day awarded by the court for 1,179 days in prison and

130. Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988).
131. Telephone Interview with John L. Stainthorp, attorney for Plaintiff George Jones,
People’s Law Office (Oct. 8, 2009).
132. Jones v. City of Chicago, No. 83 C 2430, 1987 WL 19800, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10,
1987).
133. Id. at *4.
134. Jones, 856 F.2d at 988–89.
135. Limone v. United States, 497 F. Supp. 2d 143, 244 (D. Mass. 2007), aff’d, 579 F.3d 79
(1st Cir. 2009).
136. Edwards v. Freehold Twp., No. 3:07CV043763-MLC-TJB, 2006 WL 4587710 (D.N.J.
2006) (Verdict Research Group, Inc. settlement summary).
137. See Complaint at, Edwards, No. 3:07CV043763-MLC-TJB, 2007 WL 3388973 (D.N.J.
Oct. 2, 2007).
138. Telephone Interview with Thomas J. Mallon, Attorney for Kerry Edwards, Law Offices
of Thomas J. Mallon (Aug. 3, 2009).
139. Id.
140. Databases: JV-NAT, LRP-JV, VS-JV. Search terms: “wrongful imprisonment,”
“wrongful confinement,” “false imprisonment,” “malicious prosecution,” and “wrongful arrest” on
June 1, 2009.
141. Bravo v. Giblin, No. B125242, 2002 WL 31547001 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2002).
142. Telephone Interview with Tonia Ibanez, Deputy Attorney Gen. (Oct. 9, 2009).
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adding the court’s $221,976.00 award for lost earnings.143 An award of
$1,000,000 for time spent in prison before conviction was not included in
our calculations.144 Mark Diaz Bravo was a nurse falsely convicted of
raping a patient.145 This case was cited by the Limone case.146
5. James Newsome.147 The award was fully satisfied.148 In addition
to $1,000,000 per year of imprisonment, the jury awarded $850,000 total
in attorneys’ fees, which we did not include in our calculations.149 The
jury found that officers violated Newsome’s civil rights by inducing
three witnesses to falsely testify against him.150 James Newsome was an
unemployed paralegal at the time of arrest. However, although he
testified that he was still employed, the court held that this did not
require a new trial.151 This case was cited by the Limone case.152
6. Stephen Cowans.153 Although Cowans only served 6.5 years, he
was sentenced to 35–50 years for murder, which was a factor in the
amount of the settlement.154 The Boston police department used faulty
finger printing techniques as evidence at plaintiff’s trial. Plaintiff was
released as a result of DNA testing released by the New England
Innocence Project in January 2004. That same year, Boston’s finger
printing department was closed for two years. It reopened in 2006 after
heavy audits of its internal procedures.155 This verdict summary was
found through a Westlaw verdict search.156

143. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
144. See id.
145. See Bravo, 2002 WL 31547001, at *1.
146. Limone v. United States, 497 F. Supp. 2d 143, 243–44 (D. Mass. 2007), aff’d, 579 F.3d
79 (1st Cir. 2009).
147. Newsome v. McCabe, 319 F.3d 301 (7th Cir. 2003).
148. Telephone Interview with Sean Gallagher, Attorney for Plaintiff, Bartlit, Beck, Herman,
Palenchar & Scott (Oct. 9, 2009).
149. Newsome, 319 F.3d at 303.
150. See id. at 302.
151. Id. at 307.
152. Limone v. United States, 497 F. Supp. 2d 143, 243–44 (D. Mass. 2007), aff’d, 579 F.3d
79, 106 (1st Cir. 2009)
153. Cowans v. City of Boston, No. 1:05-CV-11574-RGS, 2006 WL 4286744 (D. Mass. Aug.
4, 2006) (Verdict Research Group, Inc. settlement summary).
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. Databases: JV-NAT, LRP-JV, VS-JV. Search terms: “wrongful imprisonment,”
“wrongful confinement,” “false imprisonment,” “malicious prosecution,” and “wrongful arrest” on
June 1, 2009.
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7. Ellen Maria Reasonover.157 Reasonover was falsely convicted of
murder at an unfair trial where hearsay evidence was allowed. Her
conviction was overturned, and she settled her case with the city. Found
through a Westlaw verdict search.158
8. Eddie Joe Lloyd.159 Lloyd was exonerated by DNA evidence of
the rape and murder of a sixteen-year-old girl.160 This settlement
summary was found by running a Westlaw verdict search.161
9. Neil Miller.162 Miller was exonerated by DNA evidence.163 This
verdict summary was found by running a Westlaw verdict search.164
10. Larry Mayes.165 Originally, a jury verdict of $9,000,000 was
reached, but was appealed by Defendant. The Seventh Circuit stayed its
judgment on appeal to allow the parties to settle the case for
$4,500,000.166 This verdict summary was found by running a Westlaw
verdict search.167
11. Eduardo Velázquez.168 Prior to this action, Eduardo Velazquez
had filed and settled a lawsuit under Massachusetts’ exoneration
statute169 for the statutory maximum of $500,000.170 The police failed to

157. Reasonover v. City of Dellwood, No. 4:01-cv-01210-CEJ, 1000 WL 81189 (E.D. Mo. no
date given) (Jury Verdict Reports settlement summary).
158. Databases: JV-NAT, LRP-JV, VS-JV. Search terms: “wrongful imprisonment,”
“wrongful confinement,” “false imprisonment,” “malicious prosecution,” and “wrongful arrest” on
June 1, 2009.
159. Lloyd v. City of Detroit, No. 2:04-CV-70922-GER-SDP, 2006 WL 2062011 (E.D. Mich.
Mar. 1, 2006) (Verdict Research Group, Inc. settlement summary).
160. See id.
161. Databases: JV-NAT, LRP-JV, VS-JV. Search terms: “wrongful imprisonment,”
“wrongful confinement,” “false imprisonment,” “malicious prosecution,” and “wrongful arrest” on
June 1, 2009.
162. Miller v. Boston, No. 1:03CV10805JLT, 2006 WL 4111728 (D. Mass. Mar. 9, 2006)
(Verdict Research Group, Inc. settlement summary).
163. See id.
164. Databases: JV-NAT, LRP-JV, VS-JV. Search terms: “wrongful imprisonment”
“wrongful confinement” “false imprisonment” “malicious prosecution” “wrongful arrest” on June 1,
2009.
165. Mayes v. City of Hammond, No. 2:03-CV-379-PRC, 2008 WL 3874685 (N.D. Ind. Aug.
15, 2008).
166. Mayes v. City of Hammond, 290 Fed. App’x 945, 946 (7th Cir. Aug. 28, 2008).
167. Database: JV-NAT, LRP-JV, VS-JV. Search terms: “wrongful imprisonment,” “wrongful
confinement,” “false imprisonment,” “malicious prosecution,” and “wrongful arrest” on June 1,
2009.
168. Velázquez v. City of Chicopee, 226 F.R.D. 31 (D. Mass. 2004).
169. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258D, §§ 1–9 (2006).
170. Velázquez v. City of Chicopee, 3:03-CV-30249-MAP, 2005 WL 3839494 (D. Mass.
2005) (Verdict Research Group, Inc. settlement summary).
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disclose exonerating evidence.171 This settlement summary was found by
running a Westlaw verdict search.172
12. Bruce Godschalk.173 Godschalk was a twenty-six-year-old
landscaper at the time of conviction.174 This case was cited in a footnote
in a law review article.175
13. Clarence Elkins.176 Elkins was exonerated by DNA testing.177
This verdict summary was found by performing a Westlaw verdict
search.178
14. Olmedo Hidalgo.179 Hidalgo was convicted of murder despite
what he claimed to be overwhelming evidence of his innocence that was
withheld.180 This verdict summary was found by running a Westlaw
verdict search.181
15. Kerry Kotler.182 Kotler, who had been convicted of rape, was
exonerated by DNA evidence.183 Kotler sued for unjust conviction and
imprisonment under the state statute.184 This case was cited in a footnote
in a law review article.185

171. Velázquez, 226 F.R.D. at 32–33.
172. Databases: JV-NAT, LRP-JV, VS-JV. Search terms: “wrongful imprisonment,”
“wrongful confinement,” “false imprisonment,” “malicious prosecution,” and “wrongful arrest” on
June 1, 2009.
173. Godschalk v. Montgomery Cnty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, No. 02-6745, 2003 WL
22998364 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (ALM Media Properties, Inc. settlement summary) (discussing $740,000
settlement with the district attorney’s office); Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Wrongful Error, and
Wrongful Conviction Law, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 35, 43 n.30 (discussing both the aforementioned
settlement and a $1,600,000 settlement with the township).
174. See Godschalk, 2003 WL 22998364.
175. Garrett, supra note 173, at 43 n.30.
176. Elkins v. Ohio, No. CR-98-06041, 2006 WL 3827191 (Ohio Com. Pl. 2006) (Verdict
Research Group, Inc. settlement summary).
177. See id.
178. Databases: JV-NAT, LRP-JV, VS-JV. Search terms: “wrongful imprisonment,”
“wrongful confinement,” “false imprisonment,” “malicious prosecution,” and “wrongful arrest” on
June 1, 2009.
179. Hidalgo v. City of New York, No. 06 CIV. 13118, 2009 WL 1199430 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(ALM Media Properties, Inc. settlement summary).
180. See id.
181. Databases: JV-NAT, LRP-JV, VS-JV. Search terms: “wrongful imprisonment,”
“wrongful confinement,” “false imprisonment,” “malicious prosecution,” and “wrongful arrest” on
June 1, 2009.
182. Kotler v. State, 680 N.Y.S.2d 586 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
183. See id. at 587.
184. See N.Y. Court of Claims Act § 8-b (McKinney 2007). There is no statutory maximum
on the amount of an award under this statute. See § 8-b 6.
185. Garrett, supra note 173, at 44 n.32.
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16. Robinson.186 Plaintiff alleged failure to properly train and hire
officers and failure to disclose exculpatory evidence.187 This settlement
summary was found by performing a Westlaw search.188
17. Michael Green.189 Plaintiff was exonerated of rape via DNA
evidence190 because an analysis of a rag said to contain Plaintiff’s semen
had been fabricated. 191 As part of the settlement, the city agreed to
reopen the more than one hundred cases in which the lab technician had
testified.192 This verdict summary was found by running a Westlaw
verdict search.193
18. Darryl Hunt.194 Plaintiff was exonerated through DNA evidence
and a confession by another inmate.195 This settlement summary was
found by running a Westlaw verdict search.196
19. Stephen Avery.197 Avery was exonerated by DNA evidence.198
Avery’s case probably settled very low because he was accused of a
second murder before this case settled.199 The verdict summary was
found by running a Westlaw verdict search.200

186. Robinson v. City of Los Angeles, JVR No. 491391, 2007 WL 5476226 (S.D. Cal. 2008)
(LRP Publications settlement summary).
187. See id.
188. Databases: JV-NAT, LRP-JV, VS-JV. Search terms: “wrongful imprisonment,”
“wrongful confinement,” “false imprisonment,” “malicious prosecution,” and “wrongful arrest” on
June 1, 2009.
189. Green v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:03-CV-00906, 2004 WL 1574178 (N.D. Ohio June 7,
2004) (ALM Media Properties, Inc. settlement summary).
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. Databases: JV-NAT, LRP-JV, VS-JV. Search terms: “wrongful imprisonment”
“wrongful confinement” “false imprisonment” “malicious prosecution” “wrongful arrest” on June 1,
2009.
194. Hunt. v. North Carolina, JAS NC Ref. No. 231251 WL, 2007 WL 2791826 (N.C. Super.
Feb. 16, 2007) (Verdict Research Group, Inc. settlement summary).
195. See id.
196. Databases: JV-NAT, LRP-JV, VS-JV. Search terms: “wrongful imprisonment,”
“wrongful confinement,” “false imprisonment,” “malicious prosecution,” and “wrongful arrest” on
June 1, 2009.
197. Avery v. Manitowoc Co., No. 04-C986, 2006 WL 3955911 (E.D. Wis. 2006) (Law
Bulletin Publishing Co. settlement summary).
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. Databases: JV-NAT, LRP-JV, VS-JV. Search terms: “wrongful imprisonment,”
“wrongful confinement,” “false imprisonment,” “malicious prosecution,” and “wrongful arrest” on
June 1, 2009.
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APPENDIX III
Following is a list of the forty cases included in this Study and the
researchers who analyzed them.201
1. In re Airline Ticket Comm’n Litig., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20361
(D. Minn. Aug. 12, 1996). Tara Shoemaker.
2. In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 345
(S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 15327 (2d Cir. July 30,
2002); Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002).
Douglas Richards.
3. Ryan-House v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
33711 (E.D. Va. Jan. 10, 2005); SAJ Distribs., Inc., v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., No. 2:04cv23 (E.D. Pa. filed Nov. 30, 2004)
(Augmentin). Michael Einhorn.
4. In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 177 F. Supp. 2d
1378 (E.D. Pa. 2001). Maarten Burggraaf & Andrew Sullivan.
5. In re Buspirone Antitrust Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 340 (S.D.N.Y.
2002); In re Buspirone Patent Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y.
2002), final settlement approval, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26538
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2003). Morgan Anderson & Erika Dahlstrom.
6. Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (D. Utah
1999). Tara Shoemaker & Erica Dahlstrom.
7. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 682 (E.D.
Mich. 2000), aff’d, 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003). Morgan Anderson.
8. In re Citric Acid Antitrust Litig., 996 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Cal.
1998). Bobby Gordon.
9. In re Commercial Explosives Litig., 945 F. Supp. 1489 (D. Utah
1996). Ruthie Linzer.
10. Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2002).
Erika Dahlstrom.
11. In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust
Litig., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39841 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2006). Erika
Dahlstrom.
12. Natural Gas Antitrust Cases I, II, III & IV: Sweetie’s v. El Paso
Corp., No. 319840 (S.F. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 20, 2001); Cont’l Forge
Co. v. S. Cal. Gas Co., No. BC237336 (L.A. Super. Ct. filed Sept. 25,

201. For complete case analyses, see ROBERT H. LANDE & JOSHUA P. DAVIS, BENEFITS FROM
PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF FORTY CASES (2007), available at
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/node/10990.
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2000); Berg v. S. Cal. Gas Co., No. BC241951 (L.A. Super. Ct. filed
Dec. 18, 2000); City of Long Beach v. S. Cal. Gas Co., No. BC247114
(L.A. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 20, 2001); City of L.A. v. S. Cal. Gas Co.,
No. BC265905 (L.A. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 20, 2001); Phillip v. El Paso
Merch. Energy LP, No. GIC 759425 (San Diego Super. Ct. filed Dec. 13,
2000); Phillip v. El Paso Merch. Energy LP, No. GIC 759426 (San Diego
Super. Ct. filed Dec. 13, 2000) (El Paso). Erin Bennett & Polina
Melamed.
13. In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 191 F.R.D. 472 (W.D. Pa. 1999).
Richard Kilsheimer.
14. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 936 F. Supp.
530 (C.D. Ill. 1996). Michael Freed.
15. In re Graphite Electrodes Antitrust Litig., 2003 WL 22358491
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2003). Norman Hawker.
16. Scott Brooks, Microsoft and IBM Resolve Antitrust Issues, IBM,
July 1, 2005 http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/ pressrelease/7767.wss.
Erika Dahlstrom.
17. In re Ins. Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. 464 (N.D. Cal. 1989),
rev’d, 938 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1991), aff’d sub nom, Hartford Ins. Co. v.
California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). Maarten Burggraaf.
18. In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig. (Linerboard I), No. 1261, 2000
WL 1475559, at *1–3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2000); In re Linerboard Antitrust
Litig. (Linerboard II), 203 F.R.D. 197, 201–04 (E.D.Pa. 2001), aff’d, In
re Linerboard Antitrust Litig. (Linerboard III), 305 F.3d 145, 147–49 (3d
Cir. 2002); In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 321 F. Supp. 2d 619 (E.D.
Pa. 2004). Maarten Burggraaf.
19. In re Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litig., 918 F. Supp. 1190
(N.D. Ill. 1996). Maarten Burggraaf.
20. In re Microcrystalline Cellulose Antitrust Litig., 221 F.R.D. 428
(E.D. Pa. 2004). Michael Einhorn.
21. In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 894 F. Supp.
703 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Maarten Burggraaf.
22. Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 902 F. Supp. 1394 (D.
Kan. 1995), aff’d, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998). Joey Pulver.
23. Netscape Comm. Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action Nos. 981232, 98-1233 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 22, 2002). Andrew Smullian.
24. N. Shore Hematology & Oncology Assocs. v. Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co., Civil Action No. 04 cv248 (EGS) (D.D.C. filed Feb. 13,
2004). Tara Shoemaker.
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25. In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig., 186 F.R.D. 403 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
Stratis Camatsos.
26. Vista Healthplan, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 266 F. Supp.
2d 44 (D.D.C. 2003). Tara Shoemaker.
27. Stop & Shop Supermarket Corp. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,
Civil Action No. 03-CV-4578 (E.D. Pa. filed Aug. 6, 2003); Nichols v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 2003 WL 302352 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2003).
Tara Shoemaker.
28. In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig., 93 F. Supp. 2d 1348
(N.D. Ga. 2000). Drew Stevens.
29. Settlement Agreement, RealNetworks, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
No. JFM-04-968, M.D.L. Docket No. 1332 (D. Md. Oct. 11, 2005).
Norman Hawker.
30. Red Eagle Res. v. Baker Hughes Inc. (In re Drill Bits Antitrust
Litig.), No. 4:91cv00627 (S.D. Tex. filed Mar. 11, 1991). Ruthie Linzer.
31. In re Relafen Antitrust Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 349 (D. Mass.
2004). Morgan Anderson & Erika Dahlstrom.
32. In re Remeron Antitrust Litig., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27013
(D.N.J. Nov. 9, 2005). Morgan Anderson & Erika Dahlstrom.
33. In re Rubber Chems. Antitrust Litig., 350 F. Supp. 2d 1366
(J.P.M.L.). Ruthie Linzer.
34. In re Sorbates Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 2002 WL
31655191 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2002). Joey Pulver.
35. Sun Microsystems v. Microsoft, 333 F.3d 517 (4th Cir. 2003).
Robert Lande.
36. In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d
1279 (S.D. Fla. 2005). Morgan Anderson & Erika Dahlstrom.
37. Settlement Agreement, Transam. Refining Corp. v. Dravo Corp.,
No. 4:88CV00789 (S.D. Tex. filed Mar. 10, 1988) (Specialty Steel
Piping Antitrust Litigation). Ruthie Linzer.
38. In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 232 F.R.D. 681 (D. Kan. 2005).
Bobby Gordon.
39. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A. Inc. & MasterCard Int’l
Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 114 (2d Cir. 2005). Robert Lande.
40. In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig. (many related cases), see John M.
Connor, The Great Global Vitamins Cartel, (April 9, 2008) (unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=885968.
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